The confluence of two sets of developments has the potential to accelerate the derailment of U.S.-Turkish relations in Iraq and beyond. The first is the uncertainty over future U.S. intentions in Iraq, the outcome of the surge and the possibility of U.S. troop withdrawal or redeployment to Iraq's borders. The surge is viewed in Turkey as increasing the Kurds' influence, since Baghdad relies on them to provide extra forces to secure the capital. Although Turkish officials do not seem to contemplate alternative outcomes to a unified Iraq, almost no one in Turkey believes that the United States will be able to halt the country's spiraling deterioration.

The second is the increasing civil-military tensions, pitting Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) against a secular military-civilian coalition determined to prevent him and his party from controlling the presidency. In fact, this coalition has already succeeded in preventing the election of Abdullah Gül to the presidency and forced new parliamentary elections in July with the help of a midnight military memorandum. It is quite possible that this may turn into a "rolling coup" of sorts as the military and civilian elites accelerate their insurgent tactics in the event the AKP emerges victorious from the upcoming polls.

For the civilian and military establishment and its allies, the AKP and the Kurds represent the most pressing dangers facing the republic-Islamic fundamentalism and separatism. These domestic tensions are being played out against the backdrop of a nationalist revival, increasing xenophobia and anti-Western feelings. Turks are being fed a daily barrage of news that not only accentuates these sentiments, but recounts and warns of massacres of Turkmen in Iraq, whether in Kirkuk or Tal Afar.

While uncomfortable with both the presence of the PKK in Iraq and the continuing threat to the country's political stability and economic well-being that the domestic PKK cadres signify, the AKP's approach to the totality of the Kurdish problem is more nuanced than that of the armed forces and the hard-line civilian opposition. The AKP is far more willing to experiment with a broadening of Kurdish participation than is the military.

For all these reasons, the Iraq dossier has come to represent the government's Achilles heel. It is vulnerable to accusations of being soft on Iraqi Kurds, the United States and the PKK presence in Iraq. Unable to undermine its overwhelming parliamentary majority, the anti-AKP establishment has tried to force the government's hand to initiate some kind of cross-border military operation against the express will of the U.S. military in Iraq and Iraqi Kurds. The government-especially the prime minister-has contributed to these tensions by adopting a combative stance of its own. Erdogan, in order to protect his nationalist flank, has publicly said that Turkey would not remain a spectator to events in Kirkuk, thereby raising the specter of an intervention and outpacing the military.

American efforts at handling the intricate problem of northern Iraq have been stepped up with the appointment of General Ralston. He and his Turkish counterpart-retired General Edip Baser who was recently fired-have sought ways to improve dialogue and intelligence cooperation between the Turkish and American bureaucracies. Ralston has managed to raise the issue's salience with the White House, and as one former senior U.S. diplomat commented, "his real job is to convince CENTCOM of this issue's importance." Ralston's appointment bought Washington some time and dissuaded the Turks from militarily intervening in northern Iraq against the PKK in 2006. It is in this context that a new American promise of action was delivered recently to Ankara. The Turks, especially the Turkish army, would very much prefer if the United States, with the help of its Kurdish allies, were to deal with the PKK by force, either by decapitating the organization's leadership or eliminating it altogether. Failing that, they would like the right to begin a sustained cross-border operation of their own.

The Kurds have assumed erroneously that their privileged position in Iraq protects them from the vagaries of both U.S. and Turkish policies. KRG President Barzani's discourse has had an inflammatory impact on the Turkish domestic political scene, and the United States has to not only impress upon the Kurds the precariousness of their current situation but also make use of its considerable influence with the KRG to change its tactics. The KRG's strategic imperative requires it to get along with Ankara, and it is in serious need of a "charm offensive" there. To be fair to Barzani and Iraqi Kurds, the Turkish discussion of them is equally provocative and unhelpful. While this is something both the Iraqi and the U.S. governments recognize, it is only likely to change with increased cooperation.

It is the Turks who have to execute the most important and, admittedly, conceptually difficult somersault. In a year of elections-and with the public riled up about the division of Iraq and the emergence of an independent Kurdish state-to argue almost the opposite takes a leap of faith. Working with Iraqi Kurds is not a new idea, and while Özal was perhaps the first to experiment with it, others, most notably Turkish National Intelligence Organization Chief Emre Taner, undertook such an initiative in 2006 that the military rebuffed. Clearly, Turkey is in need of building a broad societal consensus, which must include its powerful military establishment. The latter has to be convinced that with the end of the PKK, Turkish Kurds will not seek federal arrangements or independence. This is a tall order, but all parties need to start somewhere.

The gain for the United States notwithstanding, there still is the construction of such a bargain. Given its sensitivity and urgency, Washington has to approach this problem on multiple fronts by engaging NGOs as well as officials from either side. At the official level, the Ralston mission can be one of the spokes, but it needs to be supplemented by parallel efforts that feed ideas and solutions into the process. With the rapidly changing situation in Iraq, Washington cannot afford to waste time and opportunities.

Henri J. Barkey is the Cohen Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University and a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC.

Essay Types: Essay