Non-Proliferation after Iraq

January 21, 2004 Topic: Nuclear Proliferation

Non-Proliferation after Iraq

Why were the non-proliferation standards set too low before the war in Iraq? Why had WMD-interested states been able to trick their way through the inspections game? Why can the standards be raised now? Why was a war needed to raise the standards?Low

September 11 finally changed that. The period since has seen the problems addressed seriously. It started with coercive diplomacy against the Taliban, coupled with high-pressure diplomacy against pro-terrorist activities of other regimes such as Pakistan. It moved on to preventive war against the Taliban, laying a potential basis for stronger diplomacy against pro-terrorist regimes elsewhere. It moved on further to coercive diplomacy against Iraq on proliferation issues, and thence to war. It has continued with semi-coercive diplomacy against proliferatory programs in other countries: diplomacy that is now bearing unprecedented, although as yet uncompleted, fruits in Iran and Libya, and significant, if still only preliminary fruits, in Pakistan, North Korea and elsewhere.

The roll-back of nuclear proliferation has finally begun. The question today is how to proceed farther, and how far it can go.

 

Ira Straus is U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO, and a lecturer in Atlantic studies for universities in Europe and Russia.