“Iraq is for Iraqis, but the U.S. can help.”
On June 22-23, fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant dealt the Iraqi security forces yet another series of embarrassing defeats in the expansive desert province of al-Anbar. In addition to four small towns being overrun by ISIL militants in pickup trucks, the group managed to wrest control of the Al-Waleed crossing on the Iraqi-Syrian border—forcing police, without army backup, to flee partly into Syria’s eastern Deir-ez-Zor province. With this latest battlefield success, ISIL has again exemplified how weak, overstretched, and disheveled Iraqi army and police units are in the Sunni-dominated provinces in the north and west, and how irrelevant the Syrian-Iraqi border has become.
The violence tearing Iraq apart is especially concerning to politicians and policymakers, Democratic and Republican alike, who were hoping that the word “Iraq” could be eliminated from the American political lexicon. Unfortunately, that wish has not been granted. Indeed, just two and a half years after U.S. combat troops departed the country for good after a tough and bloody nine-year occupation, the Washington of 2014 feels eerily familiar to the Washington of 2006 and 2007—Iraq, in other words, is on everyone’s mind.
Just as everyone in Washington has an opinion, it seems as if every Democrat, Republican, and Independent on Capitol Hill, the media, or in the think-tank industry has ideas for how the United States should deal with Iraq’s latest security crisis. Ryan Crocker, the former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and one of U.S. Foreign Service’s most effective and respected diplomats in the Arab world, wants President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry to personally invest in Iraq’s political future in much the same way that the David Petraeus-Ryan Crocker duo was able to do in 2007-2008. Fred Kagan and William Kristol are pushing for U.S. troops to return to Iraq in larger numbers than the Obama administration is willing to expend (presumably, a larger U.S. deployment would increase American leverage with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government). House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce wants U.S. drone strikes on ISIL targets immediately, while Rand Paul calls any further U.S. military intervention in Iraq’s civil conflict a terrible mistake that ignores the lessons of the U.S. occupation years earlier. And those are only a few prescriptions being offered.
President Obama and his national security team are no doubt cognizant of all of these recommendations, just as they are determined not to launch a third war in Iraq in twenty-five years. “American forces will not be returning to combat in Iraq.” Obama said on June 19 as he unveiled his Iraq policy to the American people. With Iraq synonymous with words like “disaster” and “quagmire,” Americans are incredibly happy that Obama uttered that statement.
Yet pressed by events, including an utterly disastrous and pathetic performance by the Iraqi army in the north and west of the country, the same man who successfully campaigned on ending the war is now confronted with a number of choices that could ruin his legacy as the Commander-in-Chief wise enough to terminate America’s military involvement in Iraq.
After seeing a few Iraqi army divisions collapse without a fight, President Obama announced that there would be a small deployment of 300 U.S. special operators for two limited missions: assessing where the Iraqi security forces are and what needs to happen to stop the bleeding. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets inside of Iraq have increased exponentially since ISIL took the city of Mosul nearly two weeks ago, and reinforcements have been sent to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad to secure the facility and ensure that American diplomats on the ground are safe and secure.
For many on the Republican side, particularly those like Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, and Paul Bremer who were partly responsible for mismanaging the U.S. occupation during the 2003-2006 timeframe, Obama is engaging in half-measures for the sake of his political legacy: afraid of doing nothing in the face of a jihadist menace barreling towards Baghdad, but equally afraid of tying U.S. military and intelligence resources back into a country that Americans would much rather run away from. Unfortunately for the neoconservative architects of the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq, their views are completely discredited by tens of millions of mainstream Americans.