Penetrating Counter-Air: What Comes After the F-22 Raptor and F-15C Eagle
The United States Air Force is in the process of completing its initial research on a next-generation air superiority capability to replace the Boeing F-15C Eagle and Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor fighters. Once such research is completed, the service will embark on an 18-month analysis of alternatives (AOA) starting this coming January to determine exactly what kind of capabilities it will need to gain and maintain control over the skies in the post-2030 threat environment. By then—in the year 2035—the stealthy F-22 will be 30 years old while most the F-15C fleet will be more than 50 years old. Thus, while the Air Force has not made any decisions on what a future air superiority fighter might look like, the service says that the so-called Penetrating Counter-Air (PCA) capability will be designed to meet threats that an upgraded F-22 and F-15 fleet cannot.
“We understand what the threat is going to be like in the future,” said Col. Tom Coglitore, chief of Air Combat Command’s Air Superiority Core Function Team in an interview with The National Interest. “We understand what our current and projected capabilities will be and will compare them to the future threat. If there is a gap, then we will likely pursue the development of a new capability if we cannot modernize an existing capability to fulfill our need.”
Essentially—as Coglitore explains it—the PCA is the air domain platform component of a future “family of capabilities” for air superiority. But that family of capabilities is more than just the PCA aircraft itself, it includes basing and logistics, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), command and control, as well as other platforms and weapons—both existing and future. Indeed, for the Air Force, air superiority will likely move beyond just the realm of kinetic actions to include non-kinetic effects such as electronic attack and cyber-warfare, Coglitore said.
Basing and logistics—while often overlooked—are a crucial component of modern air warfare, especially as a resurgent Russia and an increasingly powerful China develop long-range precision strike capabilities. China has developed a host of cruise and ballistic missiles that are capable of hitting U.S. bases in the Western Pacific while Russian forces possess long-range weapons such as the Kalibr-NK and Kh-101 stealthy long-range cruise missiles that can threaten U.S. bases in Europe and the Middle East. “We definitely need to be able to operate from locations, and they need to be secure,” Coglitore said. “We must be able to operate out of locations necessary to create the effects wherever they are needed.”
The Air Force is also working on concepts to secure its aerial refueling tanker fleet as part of its future air superiority efforts. The Air Force is aware that both the Russians and the Chinese expect to attack the service’s vital tankers—the very sinews that hold U.S. air operations together—as part of their efforts to defeat any American-led air campaign. Indeed, both the Russians and the Chinese have developed long-range air-to-air missiles specifically designed to attack those critical nodes. While some of the service’s longer-range plans call for developing a stealthy tanker—the Air Force is working on contingencies for the nearer-term to mitigate the threat—which the service takes seriously.
“That is a strategy others have advertised and we’re familiar with,” Coglitore said. “We’re analyzing what potential adversaries have indicated they would do and then we obviously have to come up with our own capability to make sure we can still conduct the mission and create the effects desired. So, we’re aware is the short answer and we will be prepared to counter it.”
One of the potential ways that the United States would counter such threats is by increasing the range and persistence of its aircraft, but the problem is the inherent size limitations of a fighter. “Fighters tend to be small and so their ability to persist can be seen as a limitation, so that’s something that we will definitely be looking at to see if we can change that aspect—or if we even need to,” Coglitore said.
Range and persistence have long been a problem for fighter aircraft—and it is a problem even during operations in relatively permissive environments. One example of that was the 2011 operation over Libya—which was difficult despite the North African nation’s antiquated air defenses because of the sheer distances involved. Indeed, for the Air Force, such distances could drive unaffordable force structures if future platforms have the same attributes as the service’s current aircraft fleet.
“Libya was a challenge for us,” Coglitore said. “The distances to conduct operations in Libya was a challenge. You had aircraft operating from Italy, flying three hours down to the Gulf of Sidra to cover the coast of Libya which is 1100 miles long. You do that math even with fighter airspeeds and you’ll find the surface-to-air threat wasn’t what we were concerned about, the tyranny of distance was itself was the challenge.”