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Russia's Status-6: The Ultimate Nuclear Weapon or an Old Idea That Won't Die?

According to the latest Nuclear Posture Review, Russia is developing a new nuclear torpedo/drone, the Status 6. While the torpedo (also covered here by Dave Majumdar) offers some alarming new capabilities, it’s not the first such weapon that the Russians have worked on. More importantly, the Status 6 has some potentially fatal drawbacks that limit its practical effectiveness in a combat scenario.

Precedent

Nuclear tipped torpedoes have considerable precedent from the Cold War. The earliest designs for the Project 627 “November”–class nuclear-attack submarines envisioned the boats acting as motherships for the T-15 nuclear torpedo, developed to attack NATO port facilities. These torpedoes offered the USSR a way of reducing NATO naval dominance, and also an alternative means of striking the United States. However, the T-15 only had a range of about twenty-five miles and a speed of thirty knots, making it difficult to envision situations in which a submarine could successfully deliver the attack. The project was cancelled, and the Novembers redesigned as normal nuclear attack subs. Later, both the United States and the Soviet Union would introduce nuclear torpedoes optimized for tactical roles.

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Capabilities

From the information available thus far, it appears that the Status 6 will deploy from a submarine mother ship, then move to a target under its own power and guidance. The drone reportedly will have a speed of up to fifty-six knots, the capacity to dive to 3,200 feet and a range of 6200 miles. The speed and depth capabilities of the drone make it difficult for existing naval forces to engage, as it can outdive and outrun most torpedoes. If the drone ever reaches operational status, the U.S. Navy will likely counter with its own undersea drones. With its range, the drone conceivably could be launched from shore facilities or from surface vessels, although observation of the launch of the vehicle could indicate that hostilities are about to begin or, indeed, serve as casus belli in a crisis situation.

It is unclear what degree of communication the Russians could maintain with the drone after launch, although specifications suggest that it will be controlled by surface ships. This is hardly a trivial question. If launched from maximum range, the Status 6 could conceivably take up to four days to reach its target. This makes it extremely dangerous in a crisis, as the political dynamics that hold at the weapon’s launch may not be the same as those at the moment of impact. Moreover, the prospects of a weapon navigating, on its own, for four days to a target are troubling, to say the least.

Purpose

The most obvious potential use of the Status 6 is as a strategic deterrent, designed to provide yet another means of striking the United States that ballistic-missile defense cannot defeat. Despite its extensive nuclear arsenal, Russia has long worried about the security of its second strike capability in face of the combination of a concerted U.S. attack and improving U.S. missile defenses. But as Brian Clark (via Dave Majumdar) notes, the Status 6 doesn’t offer a practical deterrent.

As a first-strike weapon, the utility of the drone would depend on utter secrecy combined with high reliability; if the Americans discovered the launch, or the drone was delayed from its target in some fashion, the element of surprise would be lost. As a last-stroke deterrent weapon, the drone would have the dual disadvantage of arriving sometime after the main action of a conflict, and potentially lacking any “shutdown” switch that would enable Russia’s political leadership to use it as a bargaining chip.

Conceivably, the Status 6 could also attack fleet concentrations, including presumably U.S. carrier battle groups. This would require more sophisticated command and control, however, or a decision to make the weapon sufficiently autonomous to decide what target to track and when to blow itself up.

Conclusion

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