The ongoing controversy surrounding Taiwan’s request to purchase sophisticated weapons systems from the United States, including 66 advanced F-16 jet fighters, continues to roil. In late July, President Obama capitulated to the demand of Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) and other pro-Taiwan members of Congress to have the Pentagon complete its report on the issue by October first and make a prompt decision thereafter. For weeks, Cornyn had held up the appointment of William Burns as deputy secretary of state until the administration agreed to his terms.
Even though a favorable decision on the arms purchase request would undoubtedly anger China, it is probable that the White House will approve the sale. Domestic economics and politics will play at least as much a role as sober foreign-policy considerations. Portions of the F-16 are manufactured in some 44 states, and the plane is assembled in Texas (which may explain Cornyn’s especially intense interest). That is not a minor consideration for an administration plagued by a persistent economic recession and facing a tough election year in 2012.
A decent case can be made on foreign-policy grounds for approving the sale of advanced weapons to Taiwan, and I have made that case in previous writings. But such a decision should always be based on a careful cost-benefit calculation. As China has grown stronger and become more important economically and diplomatically to the United States, the potential cost to Washington of angering Beijing has risen.
An especially troubling aspect of Senator Cornyn’s pleasure at the administration’s capitulation was his statement that the United States had an obligation to stand by “one of our good allies, a democracy.” That attitude is perilously close to viewing foreign policy as a risk-free expression of ideological solidarity.
Cornyn’s view is wrong on two counts. First, the security commitment to Taiwan, symbolized by continuing arms sales, is anything but risk free. China is committed to Taiwan’s eventual political reunification with the mainland. Washington’s insistence on thwarting that objective and perpetuating Taiwan’s de facto independence risks, at a minimum, severe diplomatic strains and could at some point risk a disastrous military clash.
Second, Taiwan is not an “ally,” good or otherwise. It is a security dependent—a client state. The island is simply not powerful enough to make a significant contribution to America’s security. The informal defense relationship all flows one way. Like it or not, Taiwan is a protectorate, not an ally, of the United States.
Unfortunately, Senator Cornyn’s sloppy equation of a weak security dependent with a valuable ally is all too typical of foreign-policy thinking in Washington. During the Cold War—and even more so since the end of that struggle—the United States has added an assortment of weak (and often vulnerable) security clients. One need only look at the list of America’s NATO “allies”—especially the various mini-states in the Baltics and the Balkans—to confirm just how useless most of them would be to the United States in a serious conflict.
Such so-called allies are security liabilities, not assets. Commitments to defend them expose the United States to various headaches and dangers while providing, at best, modest potential rewards. Taiwan is already in that category, and as China’s economic and military power grows, America’s military relationship with the island state will become more and more perilous. Whatever President Obama’s ultimate decision on the current arms purchase request, this unpleasant reality will not go away.
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It's sad that some consider Asia's oldest republic (The Republic of China in Taiwan) and the bastion of freedom and democracy for East Asia, the model for a democratic China, a "liability".I'd say our debt to the communists, who have usurped by force the mainland in the civil war, is a much greater liability, wouldn't you?
First, Mr. Carpenter claims that Taiwan and other security clients are not valuable allies (to the United States), but the facts disagree. The Republic of China (Taiwan) has undeniable value by virtue of its strategic geographic location, its economic relationship with the United States and its democratic development as a regional example for U.S. foreign policy goals. The island is a natural gateway at the vertex of the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea. In addition, Taiwan has a strong, well-developed economy; in fact, it is the United States’ ninth-largest trading partner. Third, Taiwan is also a vibrant democracy and its people prize their freedoms – the support and defense of these values is a core U.S. interest. Second, Mr. Carpenter feels that the United States’ security commitment to Taiwan, symbolized by continuing arms sales to Taiwan, carries the potential for a military clash with mainland China. Actually, the opposite is true – the recent positive developments in cross-Strait relations, we believe, can be correlated to increased levels of American arms sales to Taiwan over the past three years. Since President Ma Ying-jeou’s administration came to office in 2008, the United States has sold US$13 billion in weapons to Taiwan in three years (an average of US$4.3 billion annually), as compared to US$16.2 billion over the previous 12 years (an average of US$1.3 billion annually). Cross-Strait relations, however, still continue to grow closer, laying a solid foundation for the signing of the historic Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010. This shows that weapons sales to Taiwan have not impeded the development of cross-Strait relations or raised military tensions. Third, Mr. Carpenter believes that Taiwan is a security liability to the United States. In fact, the ROC shares the U.S. interest in maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. A credible deterrent capability by Taiwan decreases the risk of conflict even though the ROC has no interest in sparking a conflict. Taiwan hopes to become a regional peacemaker. In this sense, there is no expectation that the United States would become involved in any military conflict. On the other hand, the ROC government and the people who elected that government are firmly committed to defending themselves. Taiwan is not a liability, but a security asset to the United States. U.S. arms sales consolidate security ties with long-standing allies and regional partners, reinforcing America’s reputation for honoring its commitments and supporting a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world. Frank Yee Wang
Carpenter's erroneous and pro-Beijing understanding of the Taiwan issue: "China is committed to Taiwan's eventual reunification...." shows his deeply flawed understanding of regional issues and Taiwan's involvement in them. Taiwan has never been part of any ethnic Chinese emperor's domain; what is happening is pure territorial expansion, a wave of Chinese expansion that includes not only Taiwan but also the Senkaku Islands to the north and the South China Sea to the south of Taiwan as China attempts to inflate itself out to the old Manchu imperial borders, much as if Turkey claimed Bulgaria and Jordan because the Ottomans once owned them. /......................................................................................../ Carpenter and his ilk argue that the US should sell out Taiwan to avoid conflict with Beijing, but it is clear that if Taiwan were annexed to China this would only lead to conflict over the Senkaku Islands, to which Beijing invented a claim in the late 1960s, and the South China Sea. Handing over Taiwan would also lead to calls in China for the "return" of Okinawa, which many Chinese privately believe is "stolen territory"/............................................................/In other words, Carpenter's hopeless solution to the Taiwan issue, handing it over to China, would simply lead to further conflict-- except in that case, the US would not have an additional 350 fighters, a modern army, ports, and an allied people to help out. Not for nothing is the Taiwan sellout often compared to Munich; handing over Czechoslovakia not only solved a strategic headache for Berlin in getting rid of the problem of its modern army and excellent border defenses, but also ceded the Skoda arms works, one of Europe's largest, whose excellent tanks and other equipment served the German army well, but also enabled further moves by Hitler. Taiwan plays a similar role in Chinese strategic planning -- not only must the island be annexed but it also must be occupied. Yet Carpenter would like to solve this problem for the Chinese by handing over Taiwan. /................................................../The real issue, which Carpenter does not address, is not the "problem" of Taiwan but rather the long-term problem of Chinese expansion. Giving up Taiwan won't solve this problem; it will rather solve a host of problems for Beijing. Stupid, short-sighted, and uninformed -- just what I've come to expect from reading years of Carpenter's strategic suggestions.