In the wake of the 2012 election, it is clear that there has been a sea change in the perceptions of the American electorate on which party is the better steward of the country’s national-security interests. Traditionally, Republican candidates had always enjoyed a so-called “national-security advantage” (at least in those elections where foreign and defense policies were major issues). Only a short eight years ago, George W. Bush enjoyed a eighteen-point lead over John Kerry when exit polls asked voters to rate who they trusted to wage the "war on terror" more effectively, and of those voters who made national security a voting issue, sixty percent favored the Republican incumbent. No longer.
The November 2012 Rasmussen report now gives Democrats the edge when the question is posed as to which party is better equipped to deal with national security. Veterans and active duty military are more likely to split their votes rather than acting as a reliably Republican voting bloc, as occurred in other recent past elections. Exit polling after the 2012 campaign concluded suggested that President Barack Obama and his challenger, Governor Mitt Romney, polled “equally on national security” and that voters “trusted the president 11 points more on the broader category of international affairs.” Peter Beinart concluded that, in winning reelection, Obama has "broken the GOP’s decades-old advantage on foreign affairs."
What is clear, however, is that this shift has not been generated by any particular new vision of foreign affairs being proffered by the Democrats. Most commentators have noted the high degree in continuity in national-security affairs between the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Many of the signature achievements of the current administration, such as "resetting" relations with Russia, could have come verbatim from the foreign-policy playbook utilized by the national-security team of Jim Baker, Brent Scowcroft and President George H.W. Bush. Notwithstanding the use of buzzwords like "smart power," Democrats have filled the long-standing national-security gap with Republicans not by offering an alternative vision for international affairs, but by demonstrating to voters greater competence in executing foreign policy—and successfully framing Republicans as reckless and irresponsible when it comes to national security.
The Democrats have succeeded in doing what Kurt Campbell and Michael O'Hanlon advised in these pages in the days immediately following the 2004 elections, when they counseled: "The Democratic Party must reestablish its national-security bona fides among key constituencies if it hopes to win back the White House or Congress." This advice, however, is now apropos for the other side of the aisle. No Republican candidate can rely on an automatic pro-Republican "national-security constituency" in future elections.
It behooves Republicans to consider how and why the national-security gap first opened up, in the 1970s. After all, containment of the Soviet Union had been a bipartisan strategy. But what happened, particularly after the defeat of George McGovern in 1972, was the rise in the influence of idealistic and even utopian strains of thought within the Democratic Party: proponents of arms control for the sake of arms control or for holding regimes around the world to the West’s high standards of human rights and democratic norms, regardless of context.