Rand Paul’s foreign-policy speech before the conservative Heritage Foundation on Wednesday represents an event of perhaps seminal significance to the Republican Party—and the nation. The Kentucky Republican outlined a foreign-policy outlook—and perhaps the beginnings of an actual foreign policy—that would guide America along a middle path between the boundless national ambition of Republican Party neoconservatives and the isolationism of his father. He declared himself "a realist."
This is consequential in itself, given the sway of the neocon philosophy over GOP thinking since the early days of George W. Bush and the paucity of enthusiasm for realist convictions. When such a prominent Republican senator embraces the realist label, it presents just a hint of a possibility that a foreign-policy debate actually could emerge in a Republican Party long frozen in the tundra of neocon thinking.
But greater significance is embedded in Paul’s effort to elucidate just what a realist foreign policy would look like. Granted, his formulations are a bit vague, lacking the specifics that would have to emerge eventually to give his thinking force and credibility. But he put forth some powerful ideas that could capture the imagination of the American people if presented with consistency and clarity.
Consider his view of the threat posed by radical Islam, which was presented with more nuance and depth of perception than is seen in the pronouncements of most politicians these days. The senator accepts the conventional view that the West is not in a conflict with Islam itself but rather with radical elements within Islam. But he adds: "the problem is that this element is no small minority but a vibrant, often mainstream, vocal and numerous minority." Whole countries, he adds, adhere to certain radical concepts of Islam, and the Muslim peoples are animated by powerful political sentiments born of a long history of frustration and passion.
"Radical Islam," declared Paul, "is no fleeting fad but a relentless force." It makes up for its military weakness "with unlimited zeal."
Thus does Paul dismiss those who seek to minimize the potency and durability of the Islamist threat. No, he says, it isn’t going away anytime soon, and it isn’t subject to the kind of friendly outreach that President Obama seemed to embrace early in his first term. As Paul puts it, "I don’t agree with FDR’s VP Henry Wallace that the Soviets (or Radical Islam in today’s case) can be discouraged by ‘the glad hand and the winning smile.’" By invoking the memory of Wallace, probably the country’s most dangerously naïve Cold War leader of serious stature, Paul signals a dismissive attitude toward such gauzy thinking. One key aim of strategic realism, after all, is to snuff out foreign policy naivety wherever it may be found.
But it is noteworthy that Paul’s pragmatic view of the true nature of radical Islam doesn’t lead him to calls for the kinds of open-ended military excursions pushed by such polemicists and politicians as William Kristol, Robert Kagan and Senator John McCain. Paul writes:
What the United States needs now is a policy that finds a middle path. A policy that is not rash or reckless. A foreign policy that is reluctant, restrained by Constitutional checks and balances but does not appease. A foreign policy that recognizes the danger of radical Islam but also the inherent weaknesses of radical Islam. A foreign policy that recognizes the danger of bombing countries on what they might someday do.