Iran's UN Ambassador Javad Zarif soberly evaluates the Security Council resolution leveled on his country Saturday. In an interview with National Interest online editor, Ximena Ortiz, the ambassador says he does not exclude the possibility of further sanctions, claims that unlike the United States, Iran does not consider the use of force a legitimate foreign policy option, and rebukes Washington for approaching the people of the Middle East as somehow less than human.

NIo: Was Iran surprised by the vote? What is the significance of the resolution for Iran and how will Iran now respond?

JZ: Whether we were surprised can be responded on two different levels. Of course we expected the Security Council to issue a resolution. That did not come as a surprise. We knew that the Security Council was not even interested in listening to Iran. It is astonishing that in the three sessions of the Security Council it adopted a presidential statement and two resolutions-1696 and 1737-and it did not allow Iran to speak until after the meeting. And so there was no way for the Council to have firsthand information about Iranian positions.

It wasn't a surprise for Iran that, having not heard Iran's positions, they would adopt a resolution based on a line that has been presented to them. On the other hand, we were surprised because the resolution ostensibly seeks to initiate a dialogue, but we believe that the resolution actually impedes dialogue. In the past three years, Iran has had no problem with dialogue and with finding a solution. But all through the three years of negotiation with the Europeans, the insistence has been on suspension, and if you see this resolution and the previous resolution, you see that the main crux of the resolution is a request for a suspension of Iran's enrichment activities.

Now, if suspension is a euphemism for Iran abandoning enrichment activities-that may be one reading. But if they mean suspension, then suspension should be interpreted as a temporary measure in order to allow time to find a solution.

We have to see whether the council will even listened to possibilities that were offered by Iran, by experts, on a multitude of technical and legal possibiites, so that Iran could exercise its rights, could have enrichment facilities, but at the same time every concern of proliferation could be allayed.

NIo: When you say that this resolution impedes dialogue, could you clarify that? Does that mean that Iran will withdraw from negotiation?

JZ: Iran is always ready for dialogue. We have to see whether tactics followed by one or another side of this dialogue in fact helps the dialogue or creates obstacles. But I can tell you that from the beginning of the negotiations between Iran and Europe, that the Security Council was used as a threat so that the dialogue could only have one outcome.

If one party in a discussion is always confident that it can resort to an extremist instrument with the dialogue, then the propensity to do whatever is possible and useful in order to achieve a mutually acceptable solution becomes more distant.

That is why I say the resolution impedes dialogue because it gives an artificial mechanism. The Security Council sanctions will not be able to stop the Iranian program. The sanctions that are requested will not satisfy proliferation concerns. Proliferation concerns-if there are any real, sincere proliferation concerns-can be addressed through mechanisms that would bring about transparency, international monitoring and other possibilities that would provide the assurance that Iran's program will always remain peaceful. The Security Council can impose sanctions but that does not provide that assurance.

NIo: What is the impact, then, of sanctions on Iran, if they indeed turn out to have no impact on the nuclear program?

JZ: Because Iran has been denied technology over the last 27 years and this resolution only officiates what has been the policy and practice, Iran has had to be discrete in its acquisitions of peaceful nuclear technology to the point that today Iran's nuclear program has been localized. Every element of that program is produced locally and our own scientists have developed the scientific know-how in order to be able to sustain the program without any external support.

That was not always the case. Our desire was to have international cooperation in order to have access to technology. But the option that was provided to Iran throughout the past 27 years-and now more officially in this resolution-is to either accept being deprived of this technology-which is assuming greater and greater significance-or to try to develop it based on our own. Between these two options, we certainly choose the latter.

If the option were to be provided to Iran to develop this technology through cooperation, than is we have suggested an international consortium: other countries, including Western countries, could own jointly with Iran the facilities, and also jointly operate them. That would give the greatest assurance that these programs are not diverted into any illicit activities.

NIo: You mentioned also that Iran did not have the opportunity to give a presentation ahead of the Security Council decision. Why do you think the Council countries supported the revolution, particularly Moscow and Beijing? Is it your feeling that they supported the resolution out of proliferation concers, or is it your sense that there were broader, geopolitical considerations in terms of wanting to oblige Washington? What does this mean for Tehran's relationship with Moscow and Beijing?

JZ: All countries have their own bilateral relations to consider. They have their own interests. They have to define their own national interests. They might have other concerns-a desire to prevent Washington from taking a unilateralist approach. All of these may be reasons or excuses that various countries may employ in order to vote one way or the other. I think ultimately their own perception of their national interest and bilateral relations are considered in deciding how to vote for these resolutions.

In the past we have seen influence exercised unduly by the United States. Studies have been done on how the United States tries to use its various means, including financial means, in order to bring about decisions that are to its liking in the Security Council.

Iran also has bilateral relations with many countries. A number of considerations go into our decisions about the nature of our bilateral relations. And certainly the way they act in the Security Council is one of those considerations, but not the only one.

NIo: Do you expect the Security Council to take further action in regard to Iran's nuclear program? And could you please specify what Iran's redlines are? Is there a particular action that the Security Council or other parties could take that would trigger a substantive Iranian response, say of this discontinuing working with the IAEA, or taking oil off the market, or even resorting to force?

JZ: Unlike the U.S., we never say that we don't take force off the table because the UN has taken force off the table. We believe that the threat of the use of force has no place in international relations and anybody who assumes otherwise is violating basics principles of international law. But, hypothetical responses will not help anybody at this point. But what I can say is that resolutions by the Security Council will not help the cause of non-proliferation.

NIo: So you do think it's possible that you will see further actions by the Security Council that would be more comprehensive in terms of sanctions than what Iran is facing now?

JZ: We don't exclude that, we don't think it's useful, we don't think it's advisable, we don't think it's prudent.

NIo: Do you perceive any change in the U.S. attitude towards Iran since the release of the Baker-Hamilton Commission report? And how would you identify Iranian goals for Iraq? What can America offer Iran and ask from it in discussions regarding Iraq, in order to gain Iran's utmost cooperation in attempting to restrain the sectarian fighting?

JZ: Well Iran has every reason to want stability, national unity, and democracy in Iraq with representation of all Iraq's communities in the governing structure. That is our objective and that is what we believe would ensure security for Iraq and stability in the region. We have supported the government of Iraq and we will continue to support the Iraqi government. When United States goes about arresting Iranian diplomats who are in Iraq on the invitation of the Iraqi government, and are there to help the government with security, that indicates that the U.S. might not share these objectives with Iran.

As far as U.S. polices are concerned and the aftermath of the Baker-Hamilton report, what is needed is a change in the approach of the U.S. towards Iran, towards Iraq, and towards the region. What has brought all these miseries to the region is that the U.S. has dealt with the region based on wrong perceptions and a totally erroneous approach. The U.S. must come to realize that other countries have interests, have concerns, have anxieties. The U.S. must deal with these anxieties, concerns and interests, and not be concerned with only its own. Of course any country in any situation will try to maximize its national interest. That's a given. But, you have to address any situation based on a recognition that the other side also has these similar national interests.