Many in Washington and around the Asia-Pacific would have been substantially relieved had the Singapore summit actually been cancelled. After all, peace talks are complicated and they do not quite fit with the nifty paradigm of accelerating great-power competition within a New Cold War that takes us back to the “good old days” of the early 1980s. Those content with that framework—putting all eggs in the deterrence basket and hoping for the best in the resultant crises and rivalries—may wish to stop reading at this point.

Had the summit been cancelled, then there are indeed many members of the “blob” who could take ownership of this new failure of American diplomacy. On the right, of course, there are those who will not be satisfied until all Communist and/or noncompliant states are either wiped out or at least rendered prostrate. There is the nefarious tendency of leaders on that side of the political spectrum to try to prove that they are more hawkish than the next commentator, leading to a vicious cycle of bellicose blather (e.g. the “Libya model”). To state the obvious, moreover, the untimely dissolution of the JCPOA or “Iran Deal” has hardly inspired confidence that Washington will keep its word on complex international agreements focusing on nuclear proliferation. One might even reasonably wonder if the commander-in-chief, who perhaps very recently seemed to enjoy speculation over whether he might receive a Nobel Peace Prize, was fully briefed regarding the pattern of military exercises scheduled for the Korean Peninsula in the run-up to the planned Singapore Summit. Then, there are the string of right-wing commentators standing by to explain, in the event of failure, why Trump was foolish to ever “give peace a chance” on the Korean Peninsula.

And yet the other side of the political spectrum has also not entirely embraced a Kim-Trump summit either. Many liberal commentators viewed Trump’s agreement to meet with Kim as dangerously naïve and expected that the meeting would confer greater legitimacy on the regime in Pyongyang. Certainly, the Obama administration never seriously entertained that possibility with its aloof strategy of “strategic patience.” Progressive media and scholars have hardly been generating much in the way of creative solutions and proposals to defuse the crisis. Then, there was the “most dangerous” possibility noted by a Brookings scholar that a deal over denuclearization could result in the reform of the U.S.-ROK Alliance or even a reduction of the U.S. troops based on the peninsula.

Actually, when it was revealed in early May that President Donald Trump ordered the U.S. Defense Department to consider reductions to U.S. forces based in South Korea, the reaction of the “blob” was swift. The New York Times reported: “The directive has rattled officials at the Pentagon and other agencies, who worry that any reduction could weaken the American alliance with South Korea and raise fears in neighboring Japan.” While the “carrots” discussion—what little has taken place to date—tended to focus on economic incentives and future investment opportunities, that approach may have been somewhat misguided (likely by mirror-imaging) and ignored basic psychological factors in Kim Jong-un’s calculations. He does not wish to be viewed as a pathetic supplicant asking for food, energy and infrastructure handouts. Rather, the focus, at least at this initial stage, should have been on according the North Korean leader some substantial prestige benefits, as well as pointing out pragmatic approaches that urgently avoid humiliation to accomplish denuclearization and verification.

Even as the tireless advocates for the status quo ROK-U.S. alliance will howl mightily, let us consider the possible upsides of a moderate U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea and how that incentive could refocus negotiations on the goal of North Korean denuclearization. Yes, there are many upsides, even if they were left wholly unexplored in the New York Times article cited above. Let’s momentarily put aside the fact that U.S. soldiers are asked to serve so far from home and their families for the most part; that they could train more effectively on much larger and less restrictive ranges in the United States; and then there is that rather unnerving fact that their bases (e.g. Osan) in South Korea would likely be the very first targets of North Korean missiles (which might well be nuclear-armed). We will discuss these potential benefits and some others too below, but the main reason to consider a substantial (but not total) U.S. withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula is so blindingly obvious (though rarely discussed overtly) that it should be put in flashing lights: Kim Jong-un is not likely to genuinely undertake denuclearization unless he perceives that North Korea will be substantially better off. In other words, there has to be a fat and juicy carrot for Pyongyang in any future negotiation in place of vague security assurances or nebulous promises of “prosperity.” And the main benefit to North Korean security of this particular carrot would emphatically not be that it alters the military situation as it really would not, but that it simply would offer Kim a way to “save face” and “claim victory.” After all, if Washington continuously plays small ball in these negotiations (as it has in times past) and makes them all about verification procedures and timelines, then a perilous breakdown in the near future is all but inevitable.

Over the course of many columns in this Dragon Eye series, I have tried to demonstrate that China can play a very significant and positive role in denuclearization discussions and resolution frameworks. Beijing could obviously turn the economic screws on Pyongyang tighter or looser with major impacts depending on DPRK adherence to a prospective negotiated agreement. China can additionally offer crucial verification expertise and capabilities, as well as the potential to extend enhanced security guarantees that ease the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula. The prospect of thousands of IAEA inspectors crawling around caves in the North Korean countryside may well have spooked the Pyongyang security elite as they began to consider the possibilities over the last few weeks. A rather more realistic plan might be organized by Beijing with most of the inspectors themselves consisting of Chinese (and Russian) arms control experts. Likewise, the scenario in which Pyongyang was to dismantle its missile, TELs, and warheads, placing them meticulously on American ships seemed bizarre and whimsical even before the tumult over the last weeks. However, the idea of rolling these sensitive items (in stages of course) into large storage warehouses just over the Yalu on Chinese territory to be jointly monitored by North Korean and Chinese personnel could still garner support in Pyongyang possibly. Meanwhile, a sweetener of perhaps a few battalions of new Chinese T-96 tanks (polished up for the parade ground naturally enough and given as a gift from China to the DPRK) could flow south to join Kim’s rather beleaguered conventional forces as compensation for Pyongyang’s step-by-step denuclearization. Indeed, such solutions “with Chinese characteristics” should be fully explored as a possible remedy to the vast gulf that has seemed to separate the United States and North Korean negotiating teams in the run up to a potentially history-making summit.

The main contribution of this Dragon Eye series is to garner insights from Chinese-language sources, such as monitoring Chinese-language coverage of the Xi-Kim summits. In keeping with that tradition, let us underscore the gravity of the upcoming talks by returning very briefly to that frigid and ominous winter of 1950–51. That moment in history is completely pivotal to the contemporary PRC and also the evolving PLA. No wonder almost every issue of the Chinese military journal Military History [军事历史] has one or two articles at least on the “War to Resist America and Aid North Korea [抗美援朝].” A mid-2017 article, for instance, by a researcher from the Chinese Military Academy of Sciences explores the impact of the “geographic factor [地理因素]” on the Korean War. Korean geography is generally mountainous, but with significant variation and suggests the conditions are summarized by the curt phrase that “the north is high, the south is low, while the east is high and the west is low [北高南低东高西低].” It is explained that the PLA used this geography to its advantage during the early phase of the Chinese intervention, since “mountainous areas are not conducive to the use of mechanized military operations, but rather appropriate for more flexible infantry for attack and defense combat [山区不利于机械化军队行动便于灵活的步兵进行地面攻防作战].” It is further explained that the exceedingly mountainous terrain of northern Korea enabled the success of initial Chinese attacks since the UN forces were isolated and could not support one another effectively.

Still, this rendering also relates significant problems encountered by the PLA due to Korea’s geography. Most fundamentally, the analysis emphasizes that since “the Korean Peninsula is surrounded by sea areas on three sides, this was advantageous for the UN forces with their naval and air forces [三面环海利于联合国军海空优势].” Indeed, China’s “paucity of naval and airpower meant that the ability of the PLA volunteers to control their flanks was dangerously weak [由于缺乏海空力量志愿军作战空间的两翼控制能力级弱].” The piece describes Chinese advances that outran their supply lines, as well as the “significant role of frostbite in thinning the ranks [冻伤减员严重]” of the PLA contingent in Korea. The challenging geography made coordination difficult among far-flung Chinese units and this analysis relates that Chinese soldiers were outgunned by superior U.S. artillery and also tanks in the less mountainous western area of military operations. The piece relates with evident pride how PLA soldiers learned to survive in the face of ominous American firepower by digging foxholes that were .8 meters wide and more than one meter in depth. Likewise, the PLA began to develop anti-tank tactics and it is asserted that during a three day period in October 1951 that the PLA destroyed eighteen U.S. tanks and damaged eight more. No doubt, the war proved useful for honing Chinese military “innovation and . . . combat command skills [创造性 . . . 战争领导艺术]. Indeed, the PLA’s contemporary prowess in logistics, engineering, winter warfare and air defense is most likely directly attributable to lessons learned in the Korean War. The strong contemporary focus on developing air and naval forces could also be partly attributable to this initial and bloody “trial by fire” in Korea.

It is indeed true that today’s PLA is nothing like the ragged force of Chinese volunteers who entered Korea in the fall of 1950 without even proper footwear, not to mention effective weaponry, ammunition, etc. A fight today on the Korean Peninsula involving this impressively improved PLA is hardly a welcome possibility and presents yet another reason to hope that direct negotiations may actually take place between the United States and North Korea at Singapore in the coming weeks. With that ambition in mind, let us return to the issue we started with at the outset, whether indeed the U.S. troop presence in South Korea could add seriousness to prospective U.S.-DPRK talks on denuclearization. Some benefits for training, quality of life and survivability were elaborated above. We should also not forget resources obviously. True, South Korea does pay a portion of the costs of U.S. forces in Korea, but it is far from the total costs as everyone knows. With soaring national budget deficits, the expenses for major peace-time deployments abroad are simply no longer sustainable. When it is understood, moreover, that South Korean conventional forces are vastly superior to North Korean conventional forces, these American deployments are even more difficult to justify. Indeed, one can imagine that Pyongyang was genuinely intimidated by exercises, such as “Max Thunder,” for the precise reason that the North Korean Air Force is a complete joke with obsolete aircraft and no jet fuel to put at training its pilots. Then, there is the rather considerable factor that North Korean military forces do not even have proper nutrition apparently. If one realizes these basic deficiencies hold true across North Korea’s armed forces, then it becomes clear that the U.S. forces in South Korea may be making the nuclear proliferation problem actually more acute, since they only compound the vast conventional asymmetry in military power (that accompanies the economic, cultural and institutional asymmetries as well) between the two Koreas.

The idea of “alliance decoupling” is viewed as wholly distasteful by the Washington foreign-policy blob, without even a thought about how alliances sometimes cause instability, either through entrapment or triggering the security dilemma in unfortunate ways. You don’t have to have a PhD in international relations to realize that such tendencies were the major cause of the World War I. Well, then there is the tiresome argument about “credibility,” as if the American Republic would shrivel up and hide in the corner after rationalizing and reigning in various excessive commitments. On the contrary, as Stephen Walt, explains persuasively, U.S. foreign and defense policy would be immeasurably improved with enhanced credibility once commitments and interests are brought into better alignment. Moreover, the very idea of a “trip wire,” such a fashionable idea back in the Cold War, would in itself appear to indicate certain deep and rather mysterious insecurities among elites in both Washington and Seoul. Do they really consider Americans to be so dishonorable that they surmise the United States would walk away from South Korea in a time of genuine national emergency (i.e. under North Korean attack) instead of sending immediate reinforcements? Indeed, an approach that is more confident about American stoicism, realizes that there would be tangible benefits from “offshore balancing,” so that American bases would not form direct, initial targets and American forces most crucially do not trigger the security dilemma as viewed from Pyongyang. U.S. forces would still be available and indeed “all in” for worst case scenarios, should that somehow come to pass. Calm confidence could enable a more stable, less “trigger-happy,” and a genuinely more sustainable posture—in addition to forming the fundamental basis for U.S.-DPRK denuclearization talks.

Let us hope that, in the wake of pompous and careless talk about the “Libya model,” that the opportunity for peace or at least a substantially more stable and secure Korean Peninsula has not been lost altogether. Perhaps as Leon Sigal explains recently, the problem with the recent “Massive Thunder” exercise was not the exercise itself, but rather the fact that nuclear-capable B-52s played a prominent role. Maybe so. But was it really necessary to continue such massive military exercises during the course of delicate planning in the run up to the historic summit? I think not. Given immense U.S. and South Korean military superiority (both conventional and nuclear), exercise parameters and troop numbers should all have been placed on the table for discussion. If we want to see a serious negotiation with Pyongyang on denuclearization, then we had better realize that this would necessarily be a phased process lasting years, with an action-for-action concept as its core principle [行动对行动的原子]. James Clapper seems to endorse such a “tit for tat” approach that puts U.S. troops on the table when he called very recently for the United States to offer North Korea “a road map to withdrawing many of our forces from the peninsula.” A very similar “cooperation spiral” may also be the best approach because this is the conclusion of social psychology regarding efforts to foster cooperation among rivals. In other words, “tit for tat” cooperation is much more scientifically defensible than the illusory “grand bargain” leap into the unknown that is all too likely to falter, as it appeared to last week.

South Korean conservatives are said to argue for a return to the "paper of record” and it’s not particularly objective rendering of the stakes that were at issue on the Korean Peninsula in the vital negotiation that seems, against all odds, to be back on track—maybe. In considering Trump’s directive to evaluate the possibility of decreasing U.S. troops on the peninsula, the arguments of the South Korean conservatives that such measures “would expose their country to potential foes far stronger than North Korea, like China and Japan, which have invaded numerous times over the centuries.” Is there really a Japanese threat to South Korea? A Chinese threat? No, there is not demonstrably and such arguments do not merit consideration by serious analysts with a modicum of familiarity with the region’s contemporary politics.

Rather, the overwhelming imperative was and continues to be stabilizing the current crisis by codifying the “freeze” and moving toward a more stable security arrangement through gradual disarmament and enhanced engagement. Kim (and Xi also) are no doubt aware that U.S. wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Middle East have not gone well and Americans are quite plainly in no mood for new and large-scale military undertakings. Pressure tactics might have been helpful over the last year, to be sure, but plainly can also go way too far (especially since they ultimately lack credibility). The current administration, at once brave enough to break with the blob to schedule a meeting with Kim, nevertheless has almost fallen short since it has not yet put sufficiently weighty and shiny carrots onto the table to thoroughly test whether Kim is open to enabling a genuinely positive future for his country and the rest of Northeast Asia.

For those hawks apt to call any compromise or concession a form of “appeasement,” they should consider the wisdom of British prime minister Winston Churchill speaking about Korea in the dark days of December 1950: “Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.” It is likely not coincidental that his reflections on the issue evolved to consider the exceedingly dangerous age of nuclear weaponry that was just dawning in the early Cold War. There can be little doubt that the United States, along with South Korea and Japan, are today in a position of immense relative strength and need not fear basic compromises to reach common sense solutions.

The world is applauding with enthusiasm that the Trump-Kim summit is seemingly back on. Patience, determination and above all creative problem-solving on all sides will be needed to break the militarized stalemate that has held the peoples of Northeast Asia in its menacing grip for far too long.

Lyle J. Goldstein is Research Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the United States Naval War College in Newport, RI. In addition to Chinese, he also speaks Russian and he is also an affiliate of the new Russia Maritime Studies Institute at Naval War College. You can reach him at [email protected]. The opinions in his columns are entirely his own and do not reflect the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. government.

Image: South Korean President Moon Jae-in shakes hands with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during their summit at the truce village of Panmunjom, North Korea, in this handout picture provided by the Presidential Blue House on May 26, 2018.