Profiling Muslims Is Bad. So Is Ignoring Radical Islam.

Image: A Salafist demonstration in Morocco. Flickr/Magharebia, CC BY 2.0.

The West and its allies aren't paying enough attention to Salafi jihadism.

In a thought-provoking article penned in concerned words, one of the finest retired generals in the U.S. Army, Gen. David Petraeus, underscored his anxiety about “inflammatory political discourse that has become far too common both at home and abroad against Muslims and Islam.” He believes that, given the great danger of Islamist extremism, politicians “who toy with anti-Muslim bigotry must consider the effects of their rhetoric.” He asserts that demonizing a religious faith and its adherents is both contrary to fundamental American values and corrosive to U.S. national security interests. He emphasizes that statements of blanket discrimination against Islam directly undermine the United States’ ability to defeat Islamist extremists by alienating and undermining its Muslim allies. General Petraeus lays out his concern and arguments so as to inform the national debate about the stark reality of terrorism and the importance of the choice the country will make in electing the future commander-in-chief.

I fully agree with General Petraeus’s concern and broad arguments. Profiling Muslims, discriminating against Islam or lumping Muslims as radicals or terrorists is indeed abominable, contrary to American values and damaging to the war against Islamist extremism and/or terrorism. This attitude, however, should absolve neither radical Muslims who justify their violence on the basis of certain events in Islamic history or on Islam’s holy scriptures, nor Muslim regimes or rulers who encourage or promote certain variants of radical or fundamentalist Islam for domestic purposes.

It is against this relational dynamics between the rulers and ruled, on one side, and the ideology of radical Islam and the Islamic principle of da‘wa (propagation of the faith) in Muslim society, that I find inconsistency in the way in which General Petraeus, along with the Obama administration and previous ones, seeks cooperation with the United States’ Muslim allies. While the policy of cooperating with Muslim allies to fight the war on radical Islam is necessary and apt, it fails to contextualize this cooperation by neglecting to create a collaborative framework according to which the military and ideological strategies of the war against Islamist radicalism are applied.

In other words, the war on Islamist extremism (as General Petraeus and the Obama administration describe) in cooperation with U.S. allies since the events of 9/11 has had mixed results, becoming almost cyclical. Central to this condition have been the misconception of the ideology of Salafism and the warped nature of U.S. allies’ cooperation. As I explained in painstaking detail in my book Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism, Salafists aspire to found an Islamic state by returning to the authentic beliefs and practices of the first generations of Muslims (Righteous Salaf); emphasizing a particular understanding of Tawhid (God’s oneness) whereby true belief is demonstrated by both inner faith and manifest action; and ridding Islam of reprehensible innovations made by rationalizing the religion’s holy scriptures (Koran and Sunnah). What Salafists disagree over is how to bring about this Islamic ideal.

Consequently, Salafism as an ideology split into three schools, whereby each one has pursued a certain methodology to bring about an Islamic state. What I call the quietist school focuses on education and espouses an apolitical posture, because its adherents believe the time is not yet suitable to found the Islamic state. What I call the haraki (activist) school seeks political activism to safeguard Muslim community from the foibles of Muslim rulers. And finally, the Salafi-jihadist school seeks to establish the Islamic state through what Salafi-jihadis call jihad in the path of Allah. Al Qaeda, ISIS, Ansar al-Sharia and Jabhat al-Nusra, among many others, are Salafi-jihadist organizations.

Significantly, the United States’ war on Islamist extremism has been, on the one hand, mainly focused on ISIS and Al Qaeda and has not adequately extended to other Salafi-jihadi organizations. This is the case because American allies, though they are at one with the United States in fighting ISIS and Al Qaeda, have supported sister Salafi-jihadi organizations as their own proxy forces. For example, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan support a motley group of Salafi-jihadi organizations to do their bidding in Syria, Kashmir and Afghanistan. On the other hand, the quietist and activist variants of the ideology of Salafism are not sufficiently challenged throughout the Muslim world. In fact, Wahhabism as a quietist Salafi ideology is at the heart of the formal religious establishment in the Saudi kingdom. Similarly, the Deobandi school of Islam, which has been influenced by Wahhabism, is predominant in the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, a plethora of Islamist missionary organizations, affiliated loosely or strongly with Salafism, the Muslim Brotherhood or Deobandism are active in the Muslim world and among Muslim societies in Europe.

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