Russia’s willingness to use indiscriminate and brutal force in Syria runs up against an American way of warfare that stresses precision and proportionality, and looks to avoid large numbers of civilian casualties. Russian action also has caused problems in Europe, where even pro-Russian European politicians like British foreign secretary Boris Johnson have loudly condemned Russian military actions in Syria. Indeed, Russia narrowly avoided having new sanctions enacted, in addition to the ones the European Union continues to maintain as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s efforts to jury-rig a political settlement that keeps the Assad government as the preeminent actor, but creates limited zones for compliant opposition groups, contradict American preferences for a post-conflict Syrian settlement grounded in the will of the people. Such a settlement would also work against U.S. preferences for implementing a more comprehensive containment policy against Iran.

In turn, Russia has concerns of its own. Since the mid-2000s, Russian strategists have noted that conflict and instability in the Middle East invariably draws in the United States, which means that Washington has less time, energy and attention to focus on thwarting Russia, especially in the Eurasian space. The refugee crisis generated by the Syrian Civil War has also created tremendous problems within the European Union, and is weakening EU solidarity in standing up to Russia over issues like Ukraine, while the increased terrorism that has resulted has strengthened more pro-Russian political movements across Europe. Russia is thus in no hurry to “solve” Syria.

Moscow is also well aware that many in the U.S. national-security establishment view any cooperation with the Kremlin as temporary, and that when Russia has helped the United States with tackling other issues like Afghanistan, North Korea and Iran, its “reward” has been increased American scrutiny and pressure. Significant portions of the Russian strategic establishment worry that cooperative action on Syria to rapidly end the crisis then would then free the United States and Europe to resume efforts in Ukraine that Moscow considers hostile to its interests.

U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Syria: Difficult, But Not Impossible

While there are considerable obstacles, there are ways in which the United States and Russia to cooperate on Syria. However, it is essential that if the new administration signals it is interested in pursuing such options, it must do so from a position of American strength and resolve. One of the main problems facing the United States today is that the Kremlin has assessed that America is “all talk and no action” when it comes to Syria. U.S. diplomats, for instance, have delivered long, heartfelt condemnations of Russian actions, while little has been done so far to actually change Russia’s calculations about what it can achieve on the ground, despite a multiplicity of statements about possible U.S. actions. U.S. messaging on Syria over the past several years is a stark lesson in the truth of Theodore Roosevelt’s precept, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.”

Thus, the first challenge the new team will face is ensuring that Putin does not misinterpret Trump’s willingness to consider cooperative measures with Russia as U.S. capitulation to the entire list of Russian preferences for the future of Syria, and the region as a whole. A Trump administration would also need to calibrate its rhetoric with whatever elements of America’s national-security toolbox it would be prepared to use to defend any stated red lines. For any proposed cooperation to succeed, Moscow would have to understand that Russia would pay a steep price if it failed to accommodate U.S. interests in Syria or uphold its end of any bargain.

Moscow needs to understand that it cannot unilaterally write the end of the story in Syria—even with Iranian help—and present the world with a Russian fait accompli. Here, the United States has some important cards to play. Russia has been able to stabilize the Assad regime and help it regain momentum on the battlefield, but even with Iran’s help, Russia lacks the ability to restore Assad’s control over all of Syria. While Moscow gambled that a limited military intervention would succeed in altering dynamics on the battlefield, it lacks the means to wage a determined military campaign to bring about a decisive Assad victory. Moscow needs a political settlement, which can only come about with the active participation of the United States and its allies. Russia’s own security is imperiled if all it can achieve is an uncertain stalemate, which only increases the risk that unsettled conditions in Syria could lead to new terrorist attacks within Russia itself.

Moreover, reconstructing the country, in order to encourage refugees to return and drain the swamps that foster the growth of extremist movements like the Islamic State, will require immense resources. Even the low-end estimates of Syria reconstruction now surpass $180 billion—and Moscow and Tehran do not have such funds at their disposal. China has not shown much interest in bankrolling Syrian reconstruction. Even the “New Development Bank,” the alternative to the World Bank set up by China, Russia and other non-Western powers, only has $100 billion in base capital. Stabilization in Syria can only come about with the active participation of America’s Gulf and European allies, and with America’s willingness to use its influence in bodies like the World Bank to locate the necessary capital.

It is thus possible to negotiate a series of quid-pro-quo arrangements that will secure key American objectives and mitigate some of the Russian actions that most violate American interests and values. Some of these quid pro quos are already in place, due to Russian negotiations with other players in the region, and can serve as the template for U.S.-Russia talks. These include:

1. Creating limited safe havens and “no bomb” areas for those Syrian opposition groups that have clearly separated from jihadi organizations, with an eye to allowing members to decamp from government-controlled areas, and making these territories de facto autonomous zones—areas where countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia may also be able to exercise influence. The Russia-Turkish dialogue on the role and capacities of the Turkish “Euphrates Shield” zone in Syria, and that no-fly zone, which has been respected by Russian aircraft, provides a model for future policy. The U.S. experience in creating de facto Kurdish zones in northern Iraq after the Gulf War provides a template for how the United States and its partners could set up these areas and facilitate the expulsion or neutralization of extremist elements.

2. Clear red lines on Iranian activity in Syria. Israel has already maintained an extensive dialogue with Moscow about what Iranian actions are intolerable from an Israeli perspective, which has in the past resulted in Israeli strikes in Syria that have nevertheless not provoked conflict with the Russians. The two countries have an ongoing deconfliction process, and Israel has relied on Russia to help moderate Iran’s behavior and military capabilities.

3. Agreements on continued strikes against Islamic State, with an eye to its eventual destruction. This requires frank talks about identifying Islamic State fighters and bases to the satisfaction of both Russians and Americans (so that not all non-regime elements are targeted by Russia as ISIS) and, more importantly, about how former ISIS territory is to be administered: what portion under direct Syrian regime control, what part under opposition groups with the help of outside powers like Turkey and Saudi Arabia who will also maintain cease-fires, and balancing Kurdish aspirations for autonomy with Turkish concerns about the rise of a second powerful Kurdish entity on its borders.

4. Enshrining a balance of power via a power-sharing framework—perhaps akin to the Taif accords that ended Lebanon’s civil war, or the Dayton Accords that ended Bosnia’s, but one that would be enforced by all parties. Here, another sense of “betrayal” from the Russian perspective is important. Moscow reluctantly acceded to the EU-brokered agreement for a staggered transition of power in Ukraine in February 2014, only to have the opposition repudiate it and move to depose Viktor Yanukovych immediately from the presidency, with no repercussions enforced by the agreement’s Western guarantors. A price for Russian cooperation on Syria is the retention of Assad for the near future, even if a long-term departure is understood and accepted by Moscow—but any sign of a bait-and-switch approach will torpedo any political arrangement with Russia.

The coordination to make a Syrian compromise work and to pursue greater action against Islamic State has the potential to restore frayed U.S.-Russia contacts in the diplomatic, intelligence and military realms. Because these arrangements would require intensive action, a beneficial side result might be to habituate parts of the Russian and U.S. national-security apparatuses to greater cooperation and joint work, of the type that was envisioned but never fully realized after the 9/11 attacks. Development of a workable process for regulating the Syria conflict might also serve as a prelude to a similar process on Ukraine—finding a balance of power and interests that all sides can live with. Russia would also expect that constructive behavior on Syria would be reflected by some consideration for sanctions relief.