This broad-based challenge to the U.S.-led global order alone would have provided sufficient reason for the American political establishment to deal more severely with Russia. But the Ukraine crisis has also cast a harsher light on U.S.-Russian interaction on other functional and geopolitical issues. On none of these issues, save those concerning the former Soviet space, are American and Russian positions diametrically or irreconcilably opposed. Instead, different understandings of the nature of international problems, goals, and tactics complicate U.S.-Russian diplomacy and compel the United States to pursue less robust policies than those it would otherwise prefer.

Iran offers an apt illustration of this. For the past decade, Russia has prevented the UN Security Council from endorsing the crippling sanctions the United States has advocated, because Russia has no interest in excessively harming a country that has largely respected its interests; because it sees preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons as less of a priority than does the U.S.; and because it rejects Washington’s pursuit of regime change in Tehran. Analogous divergences in outlook and approach obtain on most of the high-profile international issues of the past ten to fifteen years, including on Syria and Iraq in the broader Middle East, and on North Korea in East Asia, as well as on non-proliferation and counterterrorism. Whatever cooperation there has been has occurred within a competitive framework.

This competition is most intense in the former Soviet space, which Russia sees as a zone of "privileged interest," as a critical buffer against neighboring great powers. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has created various institutions designed to maintain its influence there, beginning with the Commonwealth of Independent States. The most ambitious to date is Putin's Eurasian Union, which he hopes will eventually include all the former Soviet states with the possible exception of the Baltic States. The United States has, however, made a special point of refusing to recognize any country's claimed sphere of interest. Yet it has pursued policies in the former Soviet space aimed in practice, if not in word, at limiting the Russian presence there, which is why Washington has refused to recognize or deal with any of the regional institutions Russia has sponsored, with the exception of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. That is the unspoken goal behind NATO expansion. Ukraine today is only the most visible—and dangerous—example of a more general U.S.-Russian rivalry.

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It is against this comprehensive and enduring threat (in Washington’s view) that the U.S. will now elaborate a new Russia policy. The initial decisions will of course be taken against the background of the Ukraine crisis. But even if Russia works diligently for a political resolution that respects Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, Washington will continue to seek ways to punish, constrain, and weaken Russia, now seen as an adversary.

Should the U.S.-Russia relationship further deteriorate, the United States will likely pursue the following goals:

•   Short-term: Exacting a cost from Russia for its actions in Ukraine, deterring further aggressive Russian actions, and persuading Moscow to support a political resolution acceptable to what the United States considers to be the legitimate Ukrainian government under President Poroshenko

•   Medium-term: Degrading Russian capabilities and reducing its options for expanding its sway in the former Soviet space and projecting its influence abroad, particularly into Europe

•   Long-term: Exacerbating internal tensions in Russia in the hope that this will lead to the mellowing of the current regime, or its overthrow

The United States, alone and together with its various allies and partners, has already taken a number of steps in pursuit of these goals. They include imposing targeted sanctions against a limited number of Russian officials, and on other individuals and commercial entities considered financially close to Putin, as well as on a number of Russian defense firms; placing restrictions on new financing to Russia’s largest banks and energy companies; instituting stricter limits on the export of certain technologies to Russia; putting limitations on Russian access to certain U.S. facilities involved in developing cutting-edge technologies;[7] taking steps to reassure vulnerable NATO member countries of the alliance's commitment to Article 5 collective defense guarantees;[8] and exclusion of Russian from certain international organizations and mechanisms, such as the G8, now for all practical purposes the G7. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies are threatening further sanctions.

So far, these steps have not noticeably affected Russia's policy toward Ukraine, including its support for separatist forces in eastern Ukraine and its integration of Crimea into the Russian political and socioeconomic system; on the contrary, Moscow has escalated its involvement in Ukraine as the United States and the EU have increased pressure on Russia. And they are unlikely to have much impact in the short run, because Moscow considers Ukraine to be a vital interest and is prepared to bear a heavy price to ensure that it does not move into the Western orbit. The more dangerous prospect for Moscow, however, is the longer-term implications for Russia's economic well-being of the American policies already in place and the still harsher steps the United States might take to harm Russia and its position in the world.

Another paper will focus on the economic steps the United States can take and on the challenges taking these steps will present to Russia. The focus here will be on security, energy, and related policy.

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In the security realm, the United States has several options. The first, and the most obvious, is further refocusing NATO on the emerging Russian threat. In a sense, the Ukraine crisis came as a god-send, with the alliance in the beginning stages of rethinking its mission as its involvement in Afghanistan draws to an end. Secretary General Rasmussen has called it a "game-changer" that compels NATO to reconsider an assumption that has guided defense planning for the past twenty years—namely, that Russia does not pose an imminent security threat.[9]

The NATO Summit in Wales illustrates how Washington will pursue this objective.  With the energetic support of East European allies, the United States pressed alliance members at the summit to finally make good on their earlier commitments to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense, to build up their conventional capabilities with new and more advanced equipment, and to integrate their capabilities more thoroughly. NATO’s summit communique particularly stressed the first two points.[10]

Poland and the Baltic states at a minimum will insist on more robust contingency planning and exercises for their region, and NATO could enhance its naval presence in the Black Sea. At the extreme, the United States could decide to establish a permanent military presence in East-Central Europe on the grounds that the security environment has changed in parlous ways unforeseen in 1997, thereby effectively abrogating NATO's pledge in the NATO-Russian Founding Act of 1997 to not permanently station "substantial combat forces" in that region.[11] While straining to remain within the Founding Act’s boundaries, NATO moved in this direction at the Wales Summit, when its members agreed to “continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis.”[12]

Secondly, and related to first option, as many commentators are already urging, the United States could reconsider it plans for missile defense in Europe. In 2009, the Obama administration abandoned its predecessor's plans to build missile defense sites in the Poland and the Czech Republic in favor of a different architecture, termed the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Although the administration argued then that it made the change based on a reassessment of the Iranian threat, the initial response from Moscow was positive. (Moscow's position turned negative after it analyzed more fully the capabilities of the new system.) The administration could now decide to build a more robust and capable system in Europe. And it could do that even if the ongoing P5+1 negotiation with Iran lead to a deal on its nuclear program; conceptually, missile defense was intended to defend against a broader range of threats than those from Iran and North Korea, the countries of immediate concern.[13] As part of that effort, the United States could locate more facilities in East-Central European states, including, at the extreme and most provocative, in the Ukraine. Along with the facilities would come at least a small permanent contingent of American military personnel, which would reassure the host governments of the United States' commitment to their defense.

Thirdly, the United States could further bolster its bilateral defense cooperation with former Soviet states, especially Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. There will be some pressure for the administration to press for NATO membership action plans for Ukraine and Georgia, although that remains a non-starter, given German attitudes, in particular, and given the situations on the ground in both countries. Nevertheless, the United States, alone or in cooperation with some allies, could help enhance the capabilities of these and other former Soviet states though programs similar to the train and equip program the Bush administration conducted with Georgia. Closer intelligence cooperation—especially on the Russian threat—could also be part of the package. After the NATO Summit, the White House issued a fact sheet describing some steps in this direction. Two military exercises involving Ukraine—one on Ukrainian territory—are planned for September.[14]