The Making of Future American Grand Strategy

January 27, 2015 Topic: Grand Strategy Region: United States

The Making of Future American Grand Strategy

"If America is to assure its future security and prosperity, we need a new grand strategy that harnesses its peoples’ spirit, sense of optimism, and perseverance..." An excerpt of the new book by the late William C. Martel. 

In direct contrast with the opposite viewpoint to which many policymakers have adhered since the end of the Cold War, a number of developments point to an increasingly unstable world. One source of the problem is systemic shifts in the geopolitical, social, and economic status quo, all of which defy comprehension, but require policymakers to adapt intellectually to these challenges. Part of the problem is the unwillingness of policymakers to adopt new forms of strategic thinking—a result, perhaps, of clinging stubbornly to familiar approaches despite overwhelming evidence that the world is gripped by profound uncertainties and growing disorder.

Current Sources of Disorder

While by no means a panacea, grand strategy will help the United States understand what threats are inevitable, which ones really matter, and how to deal with them. Where states once faced singular ideological, political, or military threats, today’s problems flow from complex and overlapping sources of disorder. Furthermore, modern threats and challenges, ranging from rising great powers to unpredictable non-state actors, do not lend themselves to the simple guidance offered by earlier grand strategies. The function of grand strategy, as studied in this book, is to organize foreign policy issues in a useful way for policymakers and their society. Facing global disorder, the United States has moved well beyond the point where policymakers can rely on old solutions to new problems. Rather than using the tired approaches of focusing on states, issues, and regions that threaten U.S. interests, this chapter outlines an alternative approach. The first step in articulating a grand strategy is to categorize the fragmented, fragile, and unstable world into “sources of disorder.”

The United States faces multiple sources of disorder, which fall into several categories. The foremost sources are challenges posed by resurgent great powers, destabilizing middle powers, a rising authoritarian axis, and less predictable non-state actors. Throughout America’s history, threats have emanated from these sources of disorder with varying degrees of frequency and emphasis on certain sources over the others. For example, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed a time of intense and protracted conflict that embroiled the great powers in two deadly and costly world wars. The second half of the twentieth century was characterized by an enduring cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In today’s time, the United States faces challenges brought about by all of these sources of disorder, but by different methods and degrees than in the past. Therefore, America must develop a new strategy that incorporates action and engagement with each of them in order to maintain peace and security. The following section below includes descriptions of each source of disorder, and examples that illustrate their current state of play. While specific states and actors within these sources of disorder may change over time, this categorization is a useful tool for policymakers and students who are thinking critically about and developing a new American grand strategy.

The first category includes the challenges posed to American interests and security by resurgent great powers. The rise of China is a prominent example. Beijing’s growing economy, increasingly competent military, and assertive foreign policy signal China’s desire and ability to play a larger role in regional and global affairs. Engaging with China’s stronger regional presence requires America to reinforce both principles two and three of the grand strategy outlined here. These include reinforcing American leadership in the region and working closely with alliances and partners such as the ASEAN nations, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. If the U.S. strengthens its commitment to developing these principles, both the U.S. and its allies can effectively engage and cooperate with a stronger and more active China. However, if China’s resurgence continues in the face of American strategic drift, states in Asia will rightly worry about the territorial and security consequences of China’s rise.

Russia is another dominant example of a resurgent great power playing a more increased role in global affairs. Today, the world witnesses the Russian government’s inexorable creep toward what many see as rebirth of authoritarianism. This shift under President Vladimir Putin with his “cult of personality” has come to dominate Russian society and politics. Putin’s increasingly strident rhetoric toward the United States, past predatory energy policies towards Europe, and support for authoritarian governments in Iran and Syria are sources of growing concern for the United states and many of its allies in Eurasia. This source of disorder requires America to strengthen all three principles grand strategy. Effective engagement with Russia requires strong American leadership to pressure Russia to refrain from using its oil and natural gas as a weapon against its neighbors, including Ukraine and Georgia. Forming and bolstering alliances and partnerships with states along Russia’s border signals to Moscow that Washington will exercise leadership when Russia employs aggressive and intimidating tactics through its energy markets. Lastly, another way to effectively pressure Russia is to explore potential export markets in the United States and Eastern Europe while America’s develops its own increasing domestic sources of energy.

The second category or source of disorder includes the expected but nonetheless demanding challenge of destabilizing middle powers. Hardly a new problem, these smaller states are not simply proxies for larger adversaries, but represent powerful sources of disorder on their own that threaten to undermine peace and security. A prominent case today is Iran. Tehran’s nuclear weapon and missile programs and strident rhetoric pose, while softened by the recently elected President Hassan Rouhani, a threat to Israel and the United States. Worse, other states in the Middle East could be persuaded to develop their own nuclear deterrent. America now faces the delicate task of balancing between the West’s desire to maintain stability in the Middle East and preventing Iran from possessing nuclear weapons.

North Korea is the perpetually difficult case whose isolated and insular regime, inexperienced leader Kim Jong-un, active ballistic missile and nuclear weapon tests, moribund domestic economy, prolific international trade in illicit goods, and demonstrated aptitude for winning diplomatic concessions from the international community—all underscore Pyongyang’s ability to create disorder. In addition, the destabilizing middle powers include Afghanistan, which is slowly unraveling in the face of the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces, and Pakistan, which remains an immensely dangerous and nuclear source of disorder. The current worries include Pakistan’s instability, active support for extremist groups such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, and its nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of extremists. Lastly, the civil war in Syria, which increasingly threatens regional chaos involving Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, remains a powerful source of disorder. At this point, more than hundred thousand civilians have died, Syria’s government likely ordered the use of chemical weapons, and Russia protects President Bashar al-Assad’s government from U.S. military pressure and international diplomatic pressure. Despite a rapidly evolving situation, one enduring characteristic is that Syria sits astride a region with the potential to become a flashpoint for war.

A third source of disorder for American grand strategy is the rising “authoritarian axis.” This axis or bloc describes an imperfect but still tangible coordination between such great powers as China and Russia, and destabilizing middle powers including Iran, North Korea, and Syria. Its foremost members, China and Russia, continue to forge stronger bonds that strengthen their strategic partnership, while their support for nations like Iran and Syria constitutes a dangerous source of disorder. Iran is another case of a state that receives significant support from the axis powers, and remains a worrisome source of disorder and a potential flashpoint. As it moves closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, Iran’s enduring interest in acquiring such weapons given earlier threats to annihilate Israel, remains a subject of contentious debates in the West.

North Korea, under its leader Kim Jung-un, is a worrisome, if only slightly less dangerous, element of the authoritarian axis. It routinely threatens its neighbors with careless and reckless language, while its military and elite consume most of the nation’s scarce resources. North Korea’s principal benefactor is China, which provides significant economic support, but remains unwilling to rein in its provocative behavior. Pyongyang’s long-range ballistic missile and nuclear weapons make it clear that the “hermit kingdom,” with its past behavior of sharing such dangerous technologies with Syria and Iran, remains a source of instability in Asia.

The fourth category of sources of disorder is the eternally difficult problem of managing the less predictable non-state actors. Within this category exist several flashpoints for conflict that require increased American attention and engagement. Foremost is the resurgence of extremists in Afghanistan. With U.S. forces withdrawing and the Taliban’s power growing, Afghanistan risks sliding back into violence and repression. Accelerating its deterioration was the U.S. announcement that its forces would leave no later than 2014. Where once the Taliban believed they were losing, their resurgence is a stark reminder that they are seemingly biding their time until the U.S./NATO withdrawal. This is an illustrative example of the long-term objectives and methods employed by non-state actors who are driven by ideology. To effectively counter this source of disorder, America must continually re-evaluate and redefine new objectives and tactics in its overarching grand strategy.