Who Is More Responsible for the Rise of ISIS? Bush or Obama?
The challenge posed to the Middle East, and ultimately to America, by the group calling itself the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) has unleashed a U.S. debate of profound implications for the country’s policy making. Reduced to its essence, it can be articulated with this question: Who is more responsible for the rise of ISIS, George W. Bush or Barack Obama?
Those who pin the blame on Obama offer an argument that goes something like this: When Bush left office, he left behind an Iraqi state that was functioning and stable, thanks largely to the president’s 2007 “surge” of troops that ended a Sunni insurgency threatening to tear the country apart. All that was needed was for Obama to leave a residual U.S. military force in the country to maintain internal stability and counter any threat that might arise from Islamist radicals.
But (continuing the blame-Obama argument) the new president never appreciated the crucial importance of resolve and force in preserving global peace, for he believed that a large portion of global anti-Americanism stemmed from overly aggressive actions on the part of the United States. As the Wall Street Journal put it in a recent editorial:
“Recall that Mr. Obama won the Presidency by arguing that the U.S. had alienated the world and Muslims by recklessly using force abroad. We had betrayed our values by interrogating terrorists too harshly and wiretapping too much. Our enemies hated us not because they hated our values or our influence but because we had provoked them with our interventions.”
And so, added the Journal, Obama withdrew from the Middle East, particularly from Iraq, and avoided new entanglements, such as in Syria after its leader, Bashar al-Assad, came under attack from a powerful insurgency. It suggested also that the president has offered only weak responses to the ongoing aggressiveness of Russia, Iran and other U.S. adversaries in hopes that “the anti-American furies would subside and the world would be safer.”
In the view of those who see Obama as primarily responsible for the rise of ISIS, the original Bush strategy had been sound and was working until Obama’s full military withdrawal from Iraq opened up an avenue for the ISIS invasion. And that invasion was launched from ISIS’ foothold in Syria only after Obama had paved the way for its rise there by refusing to support moderate anti-Assad forces, which could have blunted the rise of ISIS, even as they fought Assad. The Journal summed up this historical view with a provocative flourish: “One way to start undoing the damage would be to concede that Dick Cheney was right all along.”
Like most elaborate public-policy arguments, this one contains a certain amount of truth. Obama did subordinate the significance of force to a more wispy notion of seeking stability in troubled regions through “soft-power” policies designed to assuage anti-American sentiments. And it’s possible that he could have negotiated a “status of forces” agreement with Iraq that could have made possible an ongoing U.S. residual force in that country. The lack of such a force no doubt contributed to the ISIS emergence. As National Interest publisher Dimitri K. Simes has written in these spaces, America’s complete withdrawal allowed former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki to act on his deeply divisive authoritarian and sectarian impulses, which in turn created the ISIS opportunity in Iraq.
Further, those who argue that Obama’s foreign policy has been disjointed, ad hoc and largely ineffectual cannot be easily dismissed.
But any robust understanding of the ominous rise of ISIS must circle back to the tragic actions of George W. Bush, who lost his way almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks that killed nearly 3,000 Americans as they went about their daily routines in their own land. The powerful events of that fateful day demonstrated that America had a new enemy that needed to be understood fully. The enemy was Islamist radicalism, a substantial body of sentiment within the broader world of Islam.
Bush quickly concluded that Islamist radicalism was a warped and alien impulse within Islam that could be countered by demonstrating to mainstream Muslims the virtues and joys of Western democratic institutions. This was his first mistake. Islamist radicalism is a natural outgrowth of fundamental Islamic sentiments that have contributed to centuries of hostility between the West and Islam. As the late Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has written, “Some Westerners…have argued that the West does not have a problem with Islam but only with violent Islamist extremists. Fourteen hundred years of history demonstrate otherwise….Across the centuries the fortunes of the two religions have risen and fallen in a sequence of momentous surges, pauses, and countersurges.”