ISIS Can be Contained

A Syrian Army ZU-23-2 firing at ISIS positions near the Ithriyah-Raqqa Highway. Wikimedia Commons/Creative Commons/Abkhazian Network News Agency

Containment would place the burden of statehood on ISIS—forcing it to either moderate itself or risk implosion from within.

Two years in, the Obama administration’s strategy to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has been criticized for its overall failure to articulate an ideal end state, especially for Syria. Despite a kill-ratio of “15,000-to-1,” tactical gains have not translated into strategic success. Critics contend that current efforts to defeat ISIS are unsustainable and ill-conceived given the half-measures employed. Yet, the more salient but neglected issue is what happens after the group’s demise. Even if ISIS is defeated, the cost of stabilizing former ISIS-controlled areas promises to outweigh the current commitment to destroy the group both in blood and treasure.

Indeed, in a region rife with sectarian conflict and poor governance, the rise of ISIS is a manifestation of state-failure in Syria and Iraq. This reality presents policymakers with a stark dilemma. Dislodging ISIS from Syria would only reopen a power vacuum that could possibly be filled by worse alternatives, but vacillating on ISIS would result in the caliphate's institutions becoming more entrenched and a rogue state more likely. With the growing certainty of Mosul’s liberation, the world optimistically anticipates Raqqa to be next.

But can Raqqa be the second Mosul? Given the complexity of the Syrian conflict, it is all the more necessary to reevaluate this strategy of annihilation which has dominated the policy discourse. Instead, a strategy of containment would seek to contest the fundamental nature of ISIS’ worldview by throwing down the gauntlet of de facto (but not de jure) statehood. Paralleling George Kennan’s 1947 formulation, containing ISIS in the Middle East today would recognize the multi-generational nature of this conflict and patiently maintain the territorial status quo against the group. Contra the preferred goal of driving ISIS out of Raqqa, containment challenges the group’s ideology by permitting it to run its full course and be found wanting in its areas of control. Two pathways are possible under this strategy. Licking its battle wounds, ISIS would either seek to re-consolidate its territorial control and moderate itself, or it would, in its revolutionary fervor, continue the struggle, thereby putting it at risk of implosion.

Granted, there are valid reasons to degrade ISIS, but our analysis of interview data collected in Iraqi Kurdistan and along the Syrian border in southern Turkey present a more complicated picture of the situation in ISIS-controlled areas. These interviews were conducted with Iraqi and Syrian refugees, local NGOs and academicians, Turkish police officers, Peshmerga commanders and security officers over a course of five months from 2015 to 2016. The public rhetoric has correctly portrayed the group as fanatical and thus deserving of destruction, but our research on the internal organization of ISIS highlights three inconvenient truths which make containment of the group in Raqqa not just possible, but also desirable.

ISIS and Women

Contrary to the media’s portrayal, ISIS’ capacity as a proto-state is more resilient than we would like to believe, especially when considered through the lens of gender. Compared to al-Qaeda or the Taliban, the group’s countenancing of female involvement is unprecedented. In line with classical Islamic jurisprudence that forbids female participation in offensive jihad, ISIS initially rejected female participation during its military conquest. Upon assuming a state building role since 2014, ISIS has however adapted its theological justifications with the establishment of gender-segregated institutions to involve more women in its caliphate-building project. In an about-face from its initial restrictions, women are now playing an increasingly important role in the group’s state-like functions.

“It came to us as a surprise when ISIS did not ban women to continue working at schools and hospitals unlike the Taliban,” said a former resident of Raqqa who now lives in Sanliurfa, Turkey. Another refugee who fled Raqqa to Istanbul recounted that female doctors and nurses were still allowed to work in Raqqa General Hospital. Besides health care, women have also been employed in the police, military, education, and charity institutions. A Syrian refugee shared that her daughter’s elementary school was fully run by a principal, teachers and cleaners who were female. “Teachers who were previously working at schools were instructed to continue their jobs though they came under new rules and regulations especially in terms of the dress code and teaching curriculum,” averred the former resident of Raqqa and mother to an elementary schoolgirl. In short, fundamentalists can strive for theological consistency, but governors must be responsible. ISIS has readily adapted to the challenging ground conditions in a pragmatic bid to preserve itself. 

Responsiveness to Developments from Within & Without