The views expressed here are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense.
Iran is committed to a nuclear-energy program, and it may be committed to nuclear weapons. Israel appears committed to preventing it from getting them. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called Iran’s leadership a “messianic apocalyptic cult,” and the current composition of the Israeli cabinet is overwhelmingly hawkish on Iran. U.S. leaders have also declared that an Iranian nuclear program is unacceptable, though their rhetoric has been more restrained.
Suppose Israel or the United States launches a preventive military strike against the Iranian nuclear complex. They certainly have the capabilities to destroy large chunks of it. Even a unilateral Israeli strike would do significant damage to key sites, including the major enrichment center at Natanz. On the other hand, Israeli and American leaders might not be satisfied with the result. Given the revelation of previously hidden facilities, they might worry that Iran would still be able to pursue clandestine nuclear work even after absorbing a preventive attack. In any case, officials are likely to remain concerned as long as the Iranian regime remains in power. So while they can disable Iranian facilities and delay its progress towards the bomb, they will not be confident that they can permanently end the program. Israel and the United States cannot escape the problem of deterrence against a nuclear Iran.
In a previous post, I described four actions that the United States will seek to deter if Iran joins the nuclear club. First, it will seek to deter Iran from rapidly expanding its nuclear program in ways that could undermine the security of its fissile material. Second, it will seek to deter Iran from transferring nuclear technology to groups like Hezbollah. Third, it will seek to deter Iran from using nuclear weapons as cover for conventional aggression and stepped-up support to regional proxies. Finally, it will seek to deter Iran from using nuclear weapons in war.
The prospects for deterring each of these actions will suffer in the aftermath of a preventive attack.
Deterring a rapid expansion of the Iranian nuclear program will be much more difficult. Having been targeted already, Iran will have obvious incentives to disperse and conceal its remaining facilities, much as Iraq did after Israel’s strike against its Osirak reactor in 1981. Iranian leaders will also be tempted to increase the stockpile of weapons in order to ensure that at least some survive future strikes. Most important, an attack will empower hard-liners who have built the regime’s ideology on a foundation of resistance against the West. Attacking Iran will give them something new to resist.
Deterring the transfer of nuclear material to third parties will also be harder. Iran has historically exercised caution when dealing with groups like Hezbollah, withholding chemical weapons and other capabilities likely to provoke a direct confrontation with the United States. Iran would have less reason for caution in the aftermath of a preventive attack. On the contrary, it might conclude that dispersing some nuclear assets to regional proxies is the best way to protect them from repeated strikes.