Reacting to the Bush Administration's promise of "realism" in dealing
with Russia, a former Clinton Administration official observed that
"the issue is what is reality." Indeed it is.
Clinton Administration officials had their reality: Russia was on the
path to liberal democracy, albeit stumbling occasionally; it was
building the institutions for an effective market economy, although
suffering periodic setbacks; its large arsenal of nuclear weapons
entitled it to major power status, but at the same time the United
States could help to reduce significantly the number of operational
Russian warheads and to improve the security of Russian nuclear
weapons and materials. This assessment prompted the Clinton
Administration to believe that Russia could be induced to play a
constructive role in the Balkans, with NATO, in Iran, and elsewhere.
The Clinton reality also implied alternative futures, partly
depending on U.S. policy choices. Although never voiced as an
official view, defenders of the Clinton policy outside the
administration emphasized that Russia's progress toward liberal
democracy and economic recovery required constant U.S. support, both
with technical assistance and by encouraging generous IMF and World
Bank loans on relatively easy terms. If such support were not
provided, it was intimated, a "red-brown" Russian dictatorship would
emerge, analogous to Weimar Germany's transformation into Hitler's
Third Reich. The assumption in either case was that Russia would soon
return to the ranks of the great powers, and prudence dictated making
an effort to avoid getting on Moscow's future enemy list. If one
accepts this line of reasoning, then it can be claimed that the
Clinton Administration's assistance programs to Russia made political
sense despite their questionable economic results.
