A World in Transformation

The world we know is changing. The result is an uneasy mixture of the traditional Westphalian state system and the forces of globalization. Until we find a balance between them, this is a recipe for drift, transition and increasing chaos.

May-June 2012

THIS SPECIAL issue of The National Interest is particularly timely because we are living in a world that we know and that has shaped our thinking, but that world is in a process of transformation. We are struggling with institutions and practices of an Old World when that Old World is fading. This issue explores this global transformation, and I commend to you the articles contained here under the rubric of the “Crisis of the Old Order.”

I would like to share some of my own thoughts on this global transformation. When the Cold War ended during the presidency of George H. W. Bush, I was serving as the president’s national-security adviser. I thought at the time that the end of the Cold War marked the end of a period of history, one that began with the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The European system that had dominated the world for so long was washed away.

What followed that war was a period of instability and the rise of challenges to traditional societal organizations in the forms of fascism and communism. These ideologies took serious root in Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. The United States soon realized it had to step up to the challenges posed by these threats to our concept of democracy. After World War II, America restored a balance of power in the early nuclear age, one that saved Western Europe from the Soviet threat and brought a measure of peace and stability to the world.

When that system crumbled with the end of the Soviet Union and its empire, we in the Bush administration may have realized the end of the Cold War marked the end of a period of history, but we did not completely visualize what the emerging new era would look like. We sought to help Europe fashion itself into a more congenial, unified system. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, we were determined to reverse that aggression, consciously seeking to do it in a way that would help establish new international rules dealing with conflict in this post–Cold War world. President Bush spoke of a “new world order.” And it was true that we in the administration knew the situation called for some kind of new global vision. But we were essentially feeling our way in the dark. We sought to empower the UN Security Council’s operations in the manner its founders had visualized and to organize an international coalition of forces to implement Security Council resolutions.

Then something truly fundamental became apparent, and it deeply affected the whole system. I refer to globalization, the inexorable convergence of markets, nation-states, peoples, technologies and forms of communication across national borders. It actually began during the Cold War but was slowed by that divided world. This is a significant force, working at base to undermine the old Westphalian state system that for so long dominated most of world thinking—particularly Western thinking. That venerable system was based on the concept of the sovereignty of the nation-state, territoriality and freedom of nation-states from internal interference by other nations. This concept—underpinned by industrialization, which greatly strengthened the power of the state itself—was embraced over centuries by nearly all nations, a notable exception being China. It spawned the nationalism that flowered particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Whereas industrialization strengthened the power of the state, globalization erodes national boundaries. More and more, things that need to be done in the world can only be done across national borders through cooperation between and among nations. The world is now operating under an uneasy mixture of the traditional Westphalian system and this new, globalized model intent on pushing things in a different direction.

Take as an example the financial crisis of 2008. The crisis demonstrated that we had a single worldwide financial system in which a crisis in one area could quickly spread throughout the world. But the world clearly had no single global way to deal with that crisis. This was far different even from the end of World War II, when a preeminent nation—the United States—could lead the free world in crafting a unified system for dealing with global economic problems. The result was the Bretton Woods agreement, establishing a system of monetary- and economic-policy management among nations so the industrial world could have rules governing commercial and financial relations. The postwar leaders set up the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to develop rules of the road. The new G-20 is but a pale reflection of that once-brilliant institution building.

Those of us who studied world politics long ago in graduate school recall that nearly every textbook had a chapter entitled something like, “The Elements of National Power.” And we went through those elements one at a time. But power is different now. In fact, the very nature of power is being transformed. It is not based to the same extent on how many people are under arms or the strength of the national economy but instead on more subtle attributes and levers of influence. Partly as a result, it is increasingly doubtful there will be in the foreseeable future the kinds of great-power conflicts we have seen in our lifetimes.

Pages

Topics
UNGrand StrategyGreat PowersRising Powers
Regions
United States