The U.S. Military's Greatest Enemy Isn't Russia or China
A wise man once pointed out that many of the truths we cling to depend greatly on our own point of view. Relative to the 1970s and 1980s, the United States is almost incomparably powerful and secure, enjoying presumptive military advantage over any opponent or plausible coalition of opponents. We sometimes forget, for example, that there is some history to the idea of Russian troops freely operating in Ukraine.
And the point is not that the United States deserves some kind of comeuppance for its arrogance. Geopolitics isn’t a Shakespearean drama, or a morality play. Noting that Russia, China, and others have the growing capability to act independently in their regions does not imply that they will act justly, or that they have any special right to torture their neighbors.
Nor is it to suggest that the Bush and Obama administrations deserve no blame for their foreign policy choices. Allowing that they are not responsible for U.S. relative decline is different than suggesting that neither President has made serious mistakes. Moreover, there’s nothing wrong with the steps that the United States has taken designed to ensure future military superiority. The “third offset” won’t bring back the 1990s, but it will help keep the United States more than competitive against potential challengers.
Back in Sept. 2015, Air Force General Frank Gorenc argued that the airpower advantage the United States has enjoyed over Russia and China is shrinking. This warning comes as part of a deluge of commentary on the waning international position of the United States. The U.S. military, it would seem, is at risk of no longer being able to go where it wants, and do what it wants to whomever it wants. Diplomatically, the United States has struggled, as of late, to assemble “coalitions of the willing” interested in following Washington into the maw of every waiting crisis.
Does this mean that U.S. global power in on the wane? If so, should we blame this decline on specific policy decisions made by this administration, or the previous administration? As Dan Drezner has argued with respect to who is “winning” the Ukraine crisis, the answer depends crucially on the starting point.
In the early 1990s, the United States established a degree of military and political supremacy rarely, if ever, glimpsed in the history of the modern state system. This supremacy was built on a degree of long-term economic stability and growth that rarely endures in advanced economies. An extremely advantageous geographic situation abetted this advantage, along with the near collapse of America’s premier strategic competitor. The rest of the world’s major players decided to go along in order to get along.
The successful U.S. embrace of standoff precision-guided munitions (PGM), combined with effective and well-financed investments in training and force protection, made the U.S. military effectively unbeatable in conventional conflict. This did not always mean that the United States military could achieve its political objectives through the use of force, but it generally meant that the U.S. could put in other military in check.
The idea that this level of dominance might wane was hardly alien to the conversation on U.S. foreign policy in the early 1990s. Liberal internationalists suggested that this represented a moment, not unlike the immediate wake of World War II, in which the United States could establish a rule-based system that would endure beyond the dwindling advantage enjoyed by American military power.
Neoconservatives, on the other hand, rejected the idea that American military power needed to decline. The draft Defense Planning Guidance document of 1992, for example, proposed a set of military, economic, and political steps designed to maintain U.S. power and preclude the emergence of peer competitors. Although dismissed at the time, many of these idea have persisted, in bipartisan form, though several Presidential administrations.
Both of these perspective had to contend with serious problems. First, even in the 1990s, very few analysts denied the potential for China and India to enjoy long-term economic growth exceeding that of the United States. While both nations had endured severe economic hardships during the Cold war, by the 1990s both were experiencing sustained growth in excess of U.S. rates, and both were becoming deeply integrated in the global economy.
Thus, the U.S. needed to either convince the Chinese and Indians to play nice, or develop a means of preserving presumptive military advantage over each. Both of these things are very hard. Moreover, the United States needed to ensure against a resurgence of traditional military powers in Eurasia, including Germany, Russia, and Japan, either through containment or co-option.
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