David Petraeus and the Afghanistan Report Card
The views expressed here are solely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, or the Department of Defense.
In March, Gen. David Petraeus was optimistic that his strategy in Afghanistan was getting results. Progress was fragile and reversible, he admitted, but it was progress nonetheless. He also expressed frustration with the CIA, whose reports were less hopeful.
In April, Gen. Petraeus was nominated to take over as CIA director. Some critics worried about the militarization of intelligence, with an increasing number of military officers taking over civilian jobs. Others doubted that he could remain objective, given his enormous personal and professional stake in the outcome of the war. After all, Petraeus was the public champion of the counterinsurgency doctrine that he claimed was necessary to defeat the Taliban and deliver stability to Afghanistan. How could he protect the objectivity of CIA analyses when he had such an obvious conflict of interest? Would he faithfully transmit analysts’ conclusions to policy makers, even if they implicitly criticized his approach to the war?
Petraeus addressed these concerns during his Senate confirmation hearings in June. “My goal has always been to ‘speak truth to power,’” he said, “and I will strive to do that as director of the CIA.” Petraeus also claimed that military and civilian intelligence reports differed because the CIA stopped incorporating new information six-eight weeks before it delivered its assessments. Stopping the clock two months early meant that the agency potentially overlooked important new information that might cause it to reconsider its conclusions. Senators did not press the issue.
Last Thursday, the Associated Press reported that Petraeus had implemented changes designed to incorporate more ground-level military reports into intelligence on Afghanistan. To bring estimates up to date, he “ordered his intelligence analysts to give greater weight to the opinions of troops in the fight.” Apparently some in the agency worried that this was part of an effort to stifle pessimistic views. At least one intelligence official warned that Petraeus had a habit of “challenging unflattering conclusions.”
The next day, CIA officials denounced the report, saying that that acting CIA director Michael Morrell agreed to the request from current commander Gen. John Allen at some point over the summer. (Although Petraeus’s confirmation hearing was in June, he was not sworn in until September.) They also downplayed the changes as procedural modifications to the semi-annual Afghanistan assessment. In the past, intelligence officers would brief senior military officials in Kabul, who would subsequently ask for opinions among their subordinates. Now they will begin by briefing battlefield commanders, who will have the opportunity to make suggestions before the assessment is complete. Analysts can make changes in response or stand firm and simply note the commander’s disagreement. CIA officials believe this is necessary to make sure that assessments benefit from the most current and comprehensive information available.
Petraeus also issued a remarkable memo to the agency workforce, which was posted on the CIA’s public website over the weekend. The memo bluntly declared that the original AP report was “flat wrong” and assured analysts that changes to the assessment procedure were not designed to produce more optimistic conclusions. In an extraordinary public guarantee against politicization, Petraeus promised that “analysis is wholly owned by our analysts. It’s yours. And when I head downtown to the White House to present the CIA’s findings, I take great pride in faithfully presenting your work to the President and to other leaders of our government.”
Despite these promises, there are still reasons to be skeptical about the background of the story and the purpose of the change in the assessment process. It might be technically true that acting director Morrell authorized the change at the request of Gen. Allen, but this overlooks the obvious influence of Petraeus, who instituted a similar military-assessment procedure while in command and requested that the CIA do the same. Moreover, it was clear from the start that no one in the Senate would seriously contest his appointment, meaning that Petraeus’s wishes had to be taken into consideration during the months before he officially took over at the CIA. (He was confirmed by the Senate 94-0.) Pinning the decision on Morrell is misleading and disingenuous.
But set aside the issue of politicization. Take Petraeus at his word, accept his promises that he will not let vested interests affect his management decisions, and assume that the shift in the assessment process is not an attempt to manipulate intelligence. Is it still a good idea?