Late August marked a significant milestone in U.S. foreign policy and military strategy, even if its implications are yet to be properly recognized. The death toll of U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan has now reached two thousand.
Half of that number came in the first nine years of the campaign. The second half came in just the past twenty-seven months, after the implementation of the counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) in Afghanistan. Five years after COIN’s ascendancy, it is time to critically analyze the empirical evidence from the strategy. The empirical data suggests that the predominant U.S. military strategy of the past half decade has not worked.
The death-toll figure of two thousand lives lost in Afghanistan represents a tragedy on several levels. It is of course a great loss for the families of those soldiers and their communities. But it is also a blow to U.S.-Afghan relations. In the past two weeks alone, at least nine Americans have been killed in insider attacks: Afghans dressed in the uniforms of Afghan Security Forces attacking U.S. soldiers.
The death toll also suggests that the lone superpower has not been able to master the art of small wars. That last point may be especially bothersome for the proponents of modern-day COIN. The implementation of COIN in Afghanistan was a mistake, even if this has only become apparent in retrospect. It is time to abandon the illusion that an effective counterinsurgency campaign will produce a decisive and apparent strategic victory in Afghanistan.
COIN’s Modern-Day Context
The implementation of modern-day COIN did not begin in Afghanistan. As a military strategy, counterinsurgency gained prominence in Iraq during 2006, when General David Petraeus and a group of advisors wrote Field Manual (FM) 3-24, the manual on counterinsurgency.
Their theory displayed an unusual level of brilliance and nuance. Most importantly, it was a strategy that stood in such sharp contrast to the “shock-and-awe” campaign that was successful in bringing down Saddam Hussein’s regime but failed in the reconstruction phase. With a focus on winning hearts and minds, an emphasis on ethics and the recognition that war is won by political (not military) victories, COIN seemed attractive to political leaders, military officials and foreign-policy experts who recognized that “hard power” and pure military might have reached the limits of their political utility in Iraq.
Political Appeal
The resurgence of the COIN strategy should thus be viewed in the context of the times in which FM 3-24 was written: in 2006, U.S. forces were facing increasing violence in Iraq, the type of violence that sparked debates over whether Iraq was descending into a civil war or not. Old notions of military power had to be discarded because they were not only ineffective but also seemed to contribute to more violence.
COIN offered a way out. Military power did have utility in Iraq, the authors of COIN seemed to say, but only if it was infused with a lot of nonkinetic elements of warfare: ethics, culture awareness, sense of proportion.
COIN’s appeal stood out because it seemed like a sensible middle ground between military power and diplomacy, an attempt to resolve military dilemmas by indirect means. Rather than using kinetic means, COIN emphasized information operations and human intelligence. Whereas the target in “regular” warfare was the enemy (and thus the goal was to kill more of the enemy), in COIN it was the hearts and minds of the local population.
One of the strongest appeals of counterinsurgency was that it aimed to build the support of the local population for the government of the host nation. The idea that this was achievable offered a long-term exit strategy, whereby the United States could leave Iraq while a friendly government in Baghdad would continue running the country, respected by its people.
Military Utility
Aside from its political appeal, as a military strategy COIN seemed to have a solid foundation. Strategists from Sun Tzu to Liddell Hart to David Galula to Lawrence of Arabia offered theories that in one or more ways tied to COIN. These strategists also wrote on topics like insurgencies, indirect means of warfare, small wars and the importance of cultural factors in warfare. COIN theorists built their strategy on that rich historic literature. In combining all the excellent thoughts of previous strategies into modern-day COIN, strategists were able to fit all dimensions of power (political, military, economic, informational) into political-military strategies that were highly complex and nuanced.
With its political appeal and its apparent soundness, COIN was accepted by political leaders and military officers as the strategy in Afghanistan. Although COIN proponents argued that the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan would not simply be a replicate of the one in Iraq, in essence it was also a large scale military campaign to win the support of the local population for the host nation government.
Comments
The author puts too much stock in the idea that COIN was really backed as a way to "win" in Iraq, or in Afghanistan when it was instituted there. In fact I tend to doubt you could have found anyone in Washington who would have taken the bet that it would lead to us "winning" in either place in any really meaningful way. On the other hand COIN did a whole lot of other things, such as delaying indefinitely any need to acknowledge failure; extend us longer and deeper in both places; falsely pacify previous news coverage increasingly making it undeniable that coalition troops were being killed for nothing; cover up the military's appalling lack of backbone previously via telling the country it could "win"; and on and on and on. In other words, as in ever more these days, it was far more sham than real. So nobody should get upset today that it didn't accomplish what it was advertised as doing: What should make us upset is not being having fought hard enough in the first place to have shown that it couldn't really work in any realistic time-frame.
@ Sin Nombre! Sir, Object of strategy is to achieve the intended ends. I would not agree with the argument that the policy makers in Washington were just flirting with it. Nevertheless, no particular strategy can project an assured victory; it remains a judgment call or entails a fair degree of risk. @ Author: Having practiced COIN myself, I believe US COIN doctrine as expounded in FM - 3-24 is a wonderful effort. However, Afghanistan has some basic pecurliarities which are responsible for the apparent failure of US COIN strategy and has not been highlighted by the author. In my view, two aspects though inter-related are largely responsible for the ineffectiveness of US / NATO COIN effort in Afghanistan: 1. Extreme contempt of foreign presence. Emanates from the Great Game Era, wherein a number of russian and english agents appeared on Afghan Soil in pursuit of extending influence of their repective empires. A Pushtun Proverb narrated & explained to me by a Pushtun Tribesman; goes to say " First a lone foreigner comes, prepares maps and explores the routes, he is soon followed by an army which burn the villages and kills its inhabitants. So kill the first foreigner who comes through". Extreme hate and abhorance to the presence of foreigners in deeply imbued in the fabric of Afghan Society, hence winning hearts and minds is highly questionable under such an environment. 2. Question of legitimacy. Legitimacy of force (undertaking COIN) in the eyes of the host nation is a pre-requisite for success. However, given the predominance of cultural abhorance of foreign presence, it is almost an impossible task. Though, besides the question mark on the legitimacy of the Iraq War in the international community, US Forces enjoyed a fair degree of legitimacy in the eyes of local Iraqi's, which thus translated in to localised success (Anbar Province is a case in point). Additionally, the high proportion of "Green on Blue" attacks in Afghanistan, accounting for 45 fatal casualties of foreign troops in 2012 alone substantiates this argument. Whereas, this phenomenon was almost unheard of in Iraq .
First of all, Patraeus dusted off COIN strategy from Vietnam for his field manual and any critique must start with Vietnam. The author is right that COIN cannot work for an invading force; it doesn’t hide more weapons and more troops being brought into the theatre of war. In Vietnam, COIN was paired with napalm bombing to ‘pacify’ local villages. “Winning over hearts and minds” became an over-used cliche the Army and civilian leaders used until the end in 1974.I am not sure, however, that the US made a serious effort at COIN in Afghanistan. When Petraeus returned as commander in Afghanistan, he actually intensified the ‘counter-terrorism’ parts of the campaign. Drone strikes and strikes within Pakistan greatly increased. The focus of leadership was on killing militants and getting Bin Laden. The whole debate before the Afghan ‘surge’ about COIN or Counter-terrorism strategy, in hindsight, was little more than a smokescreen to occupy politicians and give the WH and Generals some extra room to figure out how to deal with the mess. Petraeus served President Obama well, including overseeing the killing of Bin Laden during his tenure. It may seem ironic that the writer of the modern COIN field manual was rewarded with the CIA directorship and is now commanding fleets of drones and special ops forces as a civilian. Just where he wants to be. He couldn’t stay in the Army much longer. What better gig could a retired General ask for than to compete with his former Army buddies on funding/developing the cutting edge technologies of future warfare.
I doubt that increasing casualties is a good way to support this argument; nor does the author really explain why increasing casualties necessarily invalidates a strategy, including COIN. Perhaps COIN has failed to achieve its objectives at the resource levels earmarked for it. The US appears set to leave Afghanistan because Afghanistan is not worth employing the extra military and strategic resources, rather than through an inherent flaw in COIN. In this sense it seems the same choice is being made in Washington as in Moscow; escalate or withdraw. Given that Afghanistan is not highly valued the bias is toward withdrawal as in 1988. A lack of willingness to escalate, with the expenditiure of men and materiale that escalation entails, does not equate to an inherent logical flaw in COIN.
In any type of armed conflict, metrics are important in determining the effectiveness of a strategy, tactic or approach. The question is often which metrics to choose to determine whether or not success is being achieved. This is even more difficult in selecting the metrics to be used in measuring success or failure in countering an insurgency. This question, in itself, has driven the IJC (the International Joint Command in Afghanistan) to distraction and down a number of rabbit holes in the past several years. Using a single metric can hardly be advised.In fact, determining success itself in overcoming an insurgency is difficult. The author himself flirts with this concept in his appraisal of the current state of affairs in Iraq while utilizing the concept of "decisive" success as requirement for the success of the approach in Afghanistan. While Iraq still suffers from political violence, it is unclear whether the current regime is under an existential threat from the groups who are performing those acts. If there is not sufficient popular support, then perhaps Iraq is suffering from the equivalent of Iraqi Timothy McVeighs; criminals who are banging their heads against a wall, refusing to accept that they have no hope of toppling the regime and installing one that suits their particular bent. If there is no viable insurgency in Iraq, one that actually stands a chance of toppling the current government and installing a different one, then has not the COIN approach worked there? Just because the end result does not necessarily suit the desires of an individual (a non-Iraqi individual), a group of individuals or even the United States government, if there is no real existential threat to the Iraqi government, is there an insurgency? And if there is no insurgency where one existed before, then how was that threat removed? Can it be successfully argued that the approach of counterinsurgency did not bring about the reduction of the insurgency to the point of political irrelevance? What is the goal of counterinsurgency? It appears that, for many, the answer to that question includes an evaluation of whether or not that particular observer approves of the government or domestic political reality that results. I would submit that the goal of counterinsurgency is to bring the internal political situation, for the most part, out of the realm of warfare... the reduction of the existential threat to the government... and into the realm of civil politics. Once the existential threat to the government is reduced or removed, then you are engaged in a stability operation sans insurgency. You may call this "nation building," and you may argue that nation building is something that we should not engage in, but that is another discussion. As for whether or not the approach has been successful in Afghanistan, the subject of this article, I would submit that we are no longer solely engaged in COIN in Afghanistan. We are engaged in a withdrawal from Afghanistan, and from my very recent experience there (having returned from my third tour there only a few weeks ago), my observation is that we are going through the motions of COIN while leaning more towards the "limited counter-terrorism" approach. COIN was only attempted in Afghanistan for a very short period, with a time limit placed upon it immediately following the installation of the first real counterinsurgent commander of the conflict. The conflict in Afghanistan is deeply complex; I know this from deep personal involvement in most areas of that country. The author chose a single metric upon which to base his hypothesis; that COIN has failed in Afghanistan. A simplistic analysis of such a complex conflict fails to provide sufficient analytical weight to support the author's hypothesis.
I would say the author's thesis fails on his main point alone, which is his point that U.S. 2,000 deaths (half of that in the last 27 months, including 9 in the last two weeks killed by Afghans) equals failure. That is a fallacy and the author doesn't even attempt to explain why he thinks that arbitrary measure signifies failure. Otherwise, the author misses the boat on at least two more points. He wrongly asserts that COIN started in 2006 in Iraq -- try 1899 in the Phillipines, or the 1920's in the Caribbean, or that little war in Vietnam. He then implies we're the only COIN practitioners in Afghanistan, which totally ignores the NATO coalition that has been there for quite some time. We might be bad at small wars, but the current American death toll is not an accurate measure of effectiveness.