Shinzo Abe: Japan's Savior?

After a strong electoral showing, can the prime minister break Japan out of the lost decades?

Throughout his career, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has made no secret of his desire to be a transformational figure in Japanese history. Regularly appealing to the example of his grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, the prime minister who solidified Japan’s postwar alliance with the United States, as well as the Meiji-era oligarchs who forged the modern Japanese state and laid the groundwork for empire, Abe has presented himself as a visionary determined to rebuild Japan to compete in the twenty-first century.

Although better known as a national-security hawk that helped raise public awareness of North Korea’s abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s, Abe took a page from Japan’s Meiji leaders when he returned to the premiership in December 2012. Just as the Meiji leaders argued that a strong economy was the indispensable foundation for Japan’s national security—their slogan was “rich nation, strong army”—Abe argued that unless Japan’s economy is strong it would not be able to meet regional and global challenges. On this basis, Abe embraced unorthodox measures to overcome deflation and economic stagnation, the multipronged program that quickly became known as “Abenomics.”

On July 21, Japanese voters rewarded Abe’s determination to fix the economy by giving control of the House of Councillors, the upper house of the Japanese Diet, to the coalition of Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party and the centrist New Komeito Party. Abe’s electoral victory was not as overwhelming as one might think, since the LDP fell short of winning an absolute majority of its own, but it did guarantee government control of the legislative process for at least the next three years.

It would appear that Abe is finally in a position to leave his mark on Japan. The reality, however, is more complicated. Abe may be in control of the government, but he is hemmed in in every direction, and his government rests on a narrow foundation. Abe may, as he told an audience in Singapore on July 26, make “revolving door politics…a thing of the past,” but durability alone will not guarantee a legacy.

First, both the upper-house election returns and months of public-opinion polling reveal one central fact about the second Abe government: its support rests largely on the belief that Abe is serious about restarting the stagnant Japanese economy. Since February 2013, in tracking polls conducted by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, roughly half of respondents who support (and oppose) the prime minister have said they do so because of the government’s policies. Comparatively few respondents, approximately 10 percent, support or oppose the government because of their opinions about Abe. Interestingly, Abe has won public support for Abenomics even though most poll respondents admit that they have not personally experienced economic recovery since Abe took office. A poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in early June found that only 18 percent of respondents said they really felt the economic recovery; 78 percent said they did not. Abe appears to have tapped into a sense of hopefulness that the economy might finally improve, at least enough to bring people out to vote on July 21 despite the air of inevitability surrounding the Abe government’s victory.

But the flip side is that Abe’s fate is now tied to Abenomics. If and when doubts about Abe’s economic policies emerge, it seems inevitable that support for the Abe government will fall, which will in turn make it difficult for Abe to make progress on economic policy. And there are plenty of reasons why public belief in the efficacy of Abenomics could falter. While considerable attention has been paid headline indicators like economy’s 4.1 percent annualized growth rate in the first quarter and a 0.4 percent increase in consumer prices in June, most Japanese households are still not feeling an “Abe boom.” Most significantly, wages have not yet begun to rise, suggesting that the upward tick of prices in June may be driven more by higher import costs related to the weak yen than by more robust consumer demand. And because the vast majority of Japanese households do not directly own equities or other financial instruments, they have not benefited from this year’s stock-market rally.

Pages