The China Bluff

Forty years after the Shanghai Communiqué, Nixon’s former interpreter says Obama’s Asia pivot must account for new realities.

Forty years ago, on a clear, cold afternoon in Beijing, I followed President Nixon onto the tarmac at Beijing’s Capital Airport. I have a belated confession to make. When I tried to sleep on Air Force One on the way to Beijing, I was jolted awake by a nightmare. I dreamed that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would be standing there with his old political sparring partner and secret pen pal, Zhou Enlai. In my dream, Chiang stepped forward to greet his former friend and political backer Richard Nixon with a loudly sarcastic "long time, no see!" As we pulled up to the shabby old structure that was then the only terminal at Beijing’s airport, I peered anxiously out the window. Others were elated to see Premier Zhou emerge to greet us. I was merely relieved that he was there pretty much by himself.

It’s almost impossible today to recall the weirdness of that moment, when an American president who had made a political career of reviling Chinese communism strode without apology into the capital of the People’s Republic of China—a state and government the United States did not recognize—to meet with leaders that Chiang Kai-shek—whom we officially viewed as the legal president of all China—called "bandits at the head of a bogus regime." I had entered the foreign service of the United States and learned Chinese because I thought we would eventually have to find a way to recruit China geopolitically. I was thrilled to be the principal American interpreter as our president led an effort to do exactly that. My job was to help him and his secretary of state discuss with China’s communists what to do about other, even more problematic communists.

Last Tuesday, on the precise anniversary of that February 21, 1972, personal introduction to Beijing, I was back there—not to try to rearrange the world again but to make Chinese financiers aware of specific investment opportunities in the United States. In 1972, it was necessary for the leader of the capitalist world to save China from Soviet communism. In 2012, the world looks to China to save capitalism, and the world’s capitalists flock to China in search of funds. How very much was changed by the forces Nixon and Mao put in motion that afternoon forty years ago.

There is no more Soviet Union; the bipolar world it helped define is gone, as is the unipolar American moment its collapse created. The famous Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 opened with a long recitation of the irreconcilable differences between the United States and China on almost every major international question of the time. Encounters between Chinese and American leaders now produce far less dramatic laundry lists of relatively minor and entirely manageable frictions as well as grumbles, growls and whines about highly technical issues that lower-level officials in both countries need to work on.

China has risen from poverty, impotence and isolation to retake its premodern place atop the world economic order. The People’s Republic is now a major actor in global governance. It is fully integrated into every aspect of the international system it once sought to overthrow and, in some ways, more devoted to that system than we are. Forty years ago, China’s backwardness and vulnerability were the wonder of the world. Now, the world envies and ponders the strategic implications of China’s rapidly growing wealth and power.

Reality, unlike ghosts in China, seldom travels in straight lines. But if current trends advance along current lines, as early as 2022 China will have an economy that is one-third to two-fifths larger than that of the United States. If China continues to spend roughly 2 percent of its GDP (or 11 percent of its central-government budget) on its military as it does now, ten years hence it will have a defense budget on a par with ours today. Even with the exchange-rate adjustments that will surely take place by 2022, $600 billion or so is likely to buy a lot more in China than it can here. And all that money will be concentrated on the defense of China and its periphery, whereas our military, under current assumptions, will remain configured to project our power simultaneously to every region of the globe, not just the Asia-Pacific region.

What sort of relationship do we want with the emerging giant that is China? The choice is not entirely ours, of course. China will have a lot to say about it. To the extent we pay attention to the views of allies like Japan, so will they. But we do have choices, and their consequences are sufficiently portentous to suggest that they should be made after due reflection, rather than as the result of strategic inertia.

Right now, the military-strategic choice we’ve made is clear. We are determined to try to sustain the global supremacy handed to us by Russia’s involuntary default on its Cold War contest with us. In the Asia-Pacific region, this means "full-spectrum dominance" up to China’s twelve-mile limit. In effect, having assumed the mission of defending the global commons against all comers, we have decided to treat the globe beyond the borders of Russia and China as an American sphere of influence in which we hold sway and all others defer to our views of what is and is not permissible.

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