Much is often said about the artificiality of the modern Middle Eastern state-system, particularly Syria. Often highlighted are the region’s current “republics” as the outcome of Anglo-French colonial fancy: “contrived points on a map” in Fouad Ajami’s telling, joining together disparate peoples, fractious ethnic groups, apprehensive confessional communities and distinct autonomous provinces—into uneasy, compulsory and ultimately unhappy matrimony. This picture of Western intrusions and failed cartography is not entirely off-kilter. Yet this restive Syria protruding out of the sad canvas of the modern Middle East remains an entity that influential pundits insist on defending and preserving in its current form.
In Syria (and for that matter Iraq), more so than in neighboring Lebanon and Egypt, there has never been a uniquely Syrian territorial identity nor a Syrian entity as such. Indeed, in what became Syria in 1936—out of the carved out Ottoman Vilayets (or States) of Aleppo, Beirut, and Damascus—there was great difficulty accommodating the transition from distinct administrative units to a cohesive territorial state. Moreover, prior to Syrian independence in 1946, there had been very little in terms of national history, territorial attachment, Syrian identity and a distinct “Syrian” ethos associated with today’s modern Syrian Arab Republic. In fact, up until 1946, no such Syrian entity existed in literature, historiography or even popular expression.
There had, of course, always been a “Syria,” from classical antiquity until Ottoman times. But this was at best a loose toponymic designation; a purely topographic concept and an amorphous one at that, strictly confined to European geographic usage and European obsessions with the Eastern Mediterranean. In fact, the name “Syria” is widely believed to be of Greek, not Syrian, nor even Arab provenance. “Syria” is arguably, at least in Classical Greek usage, a referent to the place-name of those “speakers of Syrian”—or in modern times “Syriac”; a dialect of Middle Aramaic prevalent throughout Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, and widely spoken until at least the eighth century of our era.
Arabs and the Arab nationalists who have ruled Syria since independence are newcomers to this name, and can only lay claim to it through semantic trickery and verbal embellishment. “Shaam” is the name that Arabs bestowed on Syria beginning in the seventh century—that is to say, “Shaam,” or “the North” in Southern Arabian languages, as opposed to “Yemen,” or “the South” from an Arab’s geographic angle. Even to this day, most users of Arabic opt for the term “Shaam” in reference to the country of Syria and its capital city Damascus—even as the Arabized form of the noun “Syria” (Suriyya) remains the official country name.
Likewise, Syrian identity, or a sense of Syrian-ness, had been alien to the Arabs of Syria, at least until the early twentieth century. Conversely, there had been a strong bent toward Syrian-ness among Levantine Christian expats in the New World, fleeing the vagaries and injustices of the late Ottoman period. But the Syria that emerges from the writings of those émigrés was distinctly Christian, separate from the inchoate Arab nationalist concepts being sputtered in the early twentieth century. Indeed the term “Syria” that those Levantine Christians were using in their literary works, correspondence, and political writings, issued from the language and intellectual heritage of their pre-modern national churches, which were essentially “Syrian Churches” whose languages were Syriac.
As this distinct Syrian-ness began evolving and expanding politically in the early twentieth century, its exponents went to great lengths distinguishing the concept being Syrian from the nascent idea of being Arab. One such advocate of Syrian identity, Antun Saadé (1904-1949), wrote that
the Syrians have done away with the myth that they are Easterners [read, Arabs], and that their destiny is somehow linked to the destiny of the [Arab] peoples. We, the Syrians are not [Arabs…, we] are the fountainhead of Mediterranean culture and the custodians of the civilization of that sea, which we have transformed into a Syrian sea, whose roads were traversed by our ships, and to whose distant shores we carried our culture, our inventions, and our discoveries.
This laid the foundations of the conceptual, geographic, and cultural notion of “Syria” and “Syrian people” as a crucible of cultures that cannot be folded into a larger “Arab” ethnos without oversimplifying and misleading.
Add to these semantic and conceptual complexities the ethno-religious and cultural patchwork of what became the Syrian Republic in 1946, and the plot thickens. When the current Syrian state came into being, and later became independent, it was already a deeply divided entity, beset by deep-seated ethnic apprehensions, religious differences, sectarian animosities, chronic instability and failed interpretations of the territorial state. In a sense, Syria was bound to disintegrate and its contrived unity was predestined to come undone. The intransigence of the Baath Party, and the cruelty of the Assad family who ruled under its auspices—tenuous as their own Arabist credentials might have been—simply prolonged the afflictions of this unsettled mosaic. The dissolution of the Syrian entity was a matter of when, not what, why, or how.
Seeing the Future through the Past






Comments
Prof. Salameh makes a compelling argument about the impending dissolution of Syria as a nation-state. Whereas Mr. Salameh would exempt other Western created border Middle Eastern states, the ethnic, religious, tribal and even social divisions would suggest that other “Arab” entities are also likely to experience the “Arab Spring”--except for outside Western involvement.The fiction that Iraq is that image still found on world maps and not the splintered ethnic and religious it is on the ground is a useful tool for US/NATO allies for continued economic interests as well as justification for the 2003 invasion and occupation.Lebanon, however, is not exempt. Le grande lebanon was created by France to insure its Maronite supporters a state of its own. A state that not only included those areas that had a high concentration of Maronite Christians but expanded to envelop areas with larger Sunni and Shiite and Druze populations. Not mentioned by Dr. Salameh is that many Sunnis resented their inclusion and desired to with their co-religionists next door--Syria. The civil war of the 1970’s and 1980’s left scars that not healed. There may now be a different alignment of parties, but Lebanon could easily slip into anarchy as the disintegration of its neighbor encourages and incites those across the border. But unlike Syria, the US, France and Britain have and will continue to intervene in Lebanon and not undermine its nation-state status.Jordan certainly qualifies as a good example of Western created states. The Bedouin army of Abdullah was subverted from its original goal of reclaiming Damascus from the French and, instead, placed in control of the desert east of the Jordan River. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War would upset the demographic balance with the displacement of thousands of Palestinians. The loyalty of the these new citizens have raised concern for the Hashemite monarchy and they still rely upon their tribal alliances to keep the more urban Palestinians under strict observation. Here again, the US/NATO player would use both military and nonmilitary means to keep the present governmental system, and not undermine it.As for Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, its Shiite populations have caused the ruling regimes to spy on its citizens and to clamp down on its dissidents. Although seldom receiving the intense news coverage of others, the Gulf kingdoms are not only blessed with oil, but with Western willingness to look the other way to insure that those who sit on the thrones remain there.Prof. Salameh’s analysis of the destruction the nation-state in the Middle East fails in one respect--Western interference. From the creation of the borders of many of these states to opposing secular movements as Nasser’s Arab Nationalism or Ba’ath regimes while propping up conservative monarchs to invasion to undermining governments deemed unfriendly to Western economic interests, the West has and continues to play a major role in Middle Eastern politics.