The Maliki Dilemma
The recent decision by the largely Sunni Iraqiya party to end its boycott of parliament would seem like an end to Iraq’s crisis. It isn’t. At best, it is a lull.
The crisis that engulfed Baghdad before the last American soldier had even left Iraq was a product of structural problems in Iraqi politics that this week’s events have not even begun to address. However, the Iraqiya decision creates a new opening to begin a process that could eventually deal with these underlying problems. If all sides seize that opportunity, there will be real hope for Iraq. If, as seems more likely, they don’t, Iraq will lurch from crisis to crisis and eventually end up in civil war, an unstable dictatorship or a failed state.
It is important to understand what actually happened this week. Iraqiya ended its parliamentary boycott but not its boycott of meetings of the Council of Ministers. The parliament is due to consider Iraq’s annual budget, and the Iraqi leadership felt it would be disastrous for their party and the communities they represent if they were not present to ensure that they received their fair share of Iraq’s governmental pie. Iraqiya has not ended its ministerial boycott of Council of Ministers meetings, with the result that its ministers are still under suspension by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and it has threatened to withdraw from the parliament again if the prime minister does not end his attacks on them.
Maliki’s Missed Opportunity
It was Maliki who provoked the current crisis with his assault on Iraqiya, in several instances employing unsavory and even unconstitutional acts to do so. If he is willing to make some concessions to Iraqiya, it might be possible not just to defuse the current crisis but also to begin a larger process of compromise and national reconciliation that could start addressing the problems in Iraqi politics that gave rise to this crisis.
Unfortunately, the prime minister appears to see Iraqiya’s decision as a victory—he outlasted them, broke them, forced them rejoin the government without getting anything that they wanted. Indeed, Maliki has shown no sign of relenting, although he and his allies did tone down their rhetoric in recent weeks. But the prime minister has continued to fire and arrest senior Iraqiya leaders, insist that the Kurds hand over Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi for trial—despite charges that the warrant for his arrest was based on confessions induced by torture—and steadfastly refused to agree to a national conference to resolve the current impasse as proposed by Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani and accepted by the Iraqiya leadership. Although the Kurds have their own differences with Iraqiya and the Sunnis (and their own reasons for wanting to reconcile with Maliki), they see the prime minister’s actions as “final proof” that he is determined to make himself a new dictator, and so they have refused to hand over Hashimi.
What’s truly stunning is that multiple reports have surfaced to indicate that the United States has decided that the real long-term problem is Iraqiya and that Washington’s solution is to try to split the party and convince the part they see as more “progressive”—along with the Kurdish parties—to join Maliki in a new, majoritarian government that would be somewhat smaller and nimbler than the ridiculously unwieldy national-unity government that the administration foolishly insisted on back in 2010.
The Road to Hell
Perhaps the only good news in this story, if it is true, is that it almost certainly won’t work. First, if the crisis has demonstrated anything, it is how precipitously American influence has declined in just the past six weeks. The premature withdrawal of American troops removed the one thing that Iraq’s bad guys—and many of its political leaders are still bad guys—still feared. It was also the one thing its good guys still respected. Moreover, because the administration failed to put in place a comprehensive program of aid and cooperation between the United States and Iraq that average Iraqis would see as beneficial (and therefore would be loath to jeopardize), Washington did not replace the loss of American military influence with new political or economic influence. Unsurprisingly, the Iraqis have barely paid lip service to the administration’s demands.
Moreover, the Sunni leadership of Iraqiya has so far stood staunchly united, and the evidence indicates they are likely to remain such. In Iraq, there is always the risk of political defection, and the prime minister controls numerous, powerful levers he can use to try to pry apart rival coalitions. Indeed, the lure of rewards from the prime minister and the importance of retaining ministerial posts as massive patronage networks had prompted a handful of Iraqiya leaders to break ranks and return to the government several weeks ago.