With the arrest of several Pakistani citizens accused of helping the CIA track down Osama Bin Laden (one reportedly an army major), suspicions that Pakistani officials were protecting the al-Qaeda leader have been rekindled. After all, why else would the Pakistanis go after individuals whose only crime was to help the United States bring the world’s most-wanted man to justice? It would seem that the Pakistanis are broadcasting both to their own people and to the world at large that al-Qaeda should be left alone. But there is another explanation—and it is a much better one.
The operation that targeted Bin Laden was done without the knowledge or permission of the Pakistani authorities. It would have been one thing had this been an isolated incident. Bin Laden was by far the most-wanted terrorist in history, and the United States could hardly be faulted for wanting to keep the operation under the closest of holds. Even if the army generals who run the Pakistani intelligence service could have been counted on to act in good faith, who could say for certain there wasn’t an al-Qaeda informant lurking somewhere in ISI ranks? But the Bin Laden operation was not an isolated incident. Earlier this year, a CIA contractor named Raymond Davis was arrested in Lahore after killing two Pakistanis he said were trying to rob him. Pakistani officials later claimed the two men were ISI informants detailed to follow the American. It was later revealed that Davis was working for a CIA cell based in the Punjabi capital that was surveilling local Islamic militants. The targeted group was most likely the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the only Pakistani jihadist group based in the Lahore area. This raised Pakistani hackles since the Lashkar has been an important weapon in the country’s struggle with India over Kashmir and remains the only domestic radical Islamic group that has yet to turn against the state.
The Davis affair not only revealed that ISI was aware that the CIA was conducting operations on Pakistani territory without its knowledge or permission, it also provided it with ammunition to do something about it. Despite U.S. protestations that Davis enjoyed diplomatic immunity, Pakistani authorities refused to release him until the CIA provided assurances they would do a better job of keeping ISI informed about operations inside Pakistan. It was against the backdrop of these assurances that, less than a month and a half later, the United States carried out its assault on the Bin Laden compound in Abbottabad. This raid, which took place on the outskirts of an army town less than a mile from the Pakistani version of West Point, humiliated the army leadership and its ISI subordinates. It made them look like they were either in league with Bin Laden or grossly incompetent in failing to detect his presence literally under their noses. But their humiliation was also leavened with anger. The Bin Laden caper reminded them that Washington, whatever pledges it may have made, was still conducting operations inside Pakistani territory without their knowledge or permission. To say the least.
The Pakistanis decided to crack down. In recent weeks, they have reportedly cut intelligence cooperation across the board, evicted U.S. military advisors and instituted a moratorium on the issuance of visas to CIA officers newly assigned to Pakistan. They have also put increasing pressure on Washington to sharply cut back its drone attacks in the tribal areas. These attacks have overwhelmingly targeted members of the Haqqani network, the major Afghan Taliban group based in the region. This is the very same group the Pakistanis have steadfastly refused to go after—despite relentless U.S. pressure that they do so—because they see them as a hedge against what they fear will be an unfriendly Afghan government allied to their archenemy India once the United States departs the region. Here too the CIA has recruited its own network of local Pakistani informants to help it locate Haqqani network personnel for Predator attacks. Seen against the backdrop of these escalating antagonisms, it is hardly surprising that Pakistan would begin arresting citizens it had reason to believe had helped the CIA carry out the Bin Laden operation. The idea was almost certainly to deter other Pakistanis, particularly army officers, from working for the CIA without ISI permission.
The sharp deterioration in relations to which these developments attest is primarily due to the fundamentally incompatible objectives the United States and Pakistan harbor toward Afghanistan. The Pakistanis have no great love for the Afghan Taliban, but they deeply resent apparent U.S. unwillingness to take their concerns about the substantial Indian presence in their historically unfriendly neighbor seriously. They believe they have paid a very steep price for supporting Washington in the wake of 9/11. Their decision to help the United States bring senior al-Qaeda leaders to justice caused most of the domestic jihadist groups they were using against India in Kashmir to turn against them. Their decision to send the army into the tribal areas to look for al-Qaeda members caused local Pakistanis protecting them to band together into the Pakistani Taliban and wage war against the state. In their view, Pakistanis have earned a friendly government in Kabul. Yet all they seem to hear from American officials is that they have nothing to worry about because the U.S. intends to remain diplomatically engaged in the region. This is hardly reassuring coming from what they regard as a notoriously fair-weather friend.
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When the U.S. began its wrongly-targeted war on the Pashtuns in October 2001, Pakistan appealed to President Bush to end the attacks as soon as the anger-venting motive had been sated and seek, instead, political resolution/stability in Afghanistan. Pakistan also pleaded with U.S. leaders to stop characterising the Taliban as abettors in the 9/11 attacks because that shaky war-cause premise stood on extremely weak legs. The strategy of singling out for punishment the “Cold-War winning Pashtuns” (the country’s majority ethnic group, the other half of which lived on the adjoining Pakistani territory) was wrong. Pakistani leaders have repeatedly asked the U.S. not to make permanent enemies of the Pashtuns (many of them but not all Taliban) as this ethnic group held the key to future peace. In terms of the war’s fallout, Pakistan has suffered the most casualties and its physical and political infrastructure has been polarised in pro- and anti-American camps, the latter having become a huge recruiting base for new suicide bombers and terrorists. The openly insulting and contemptuous statements by U.S. officials, lawmakers, think tanks and commentators have outraged the Pakistan’s armed forces and its people. When the regular Pakistanis look around their country’s present insecurity and instability, many among them blame America for its thoughtless and shortsighted Afghan war policies and execution. And despite the loud claims by top U.S. leaders, it looks likely that America would once again evacuate in a hurry, directly sparking another bloody civil war in Afghanistan. All these consequences could still be mitigated by talking to the Pashtuns and planning with the international community a gradual, guarantees-supported withdrawal. Regrettably for both Pakistan and Afghanistan, their countries’ huge physical and cultural ruin can be directly attributed to Washington’s refusal to listen to good advice. Until 2001, the Pakistani side of the border was quiet and suicide attacks were unheard of. Extremist religious parties in the Pakistani elections hardly won 2-3% seats. The extremists are now cocksure and wrongly but profitably blame the Pakistan Army for doing America’s dirty work. In this context, the U.S. could have helped by giving Islamabad just enough warning (without risking failure) of the SEAL mission to enable Pakistan to claim that the operation had its approval with joint U.S.-Pak objectives in mind, but Washington did not, as it had done on several previous occasions, do that turn to its ally (yes, everyone still agrees on that term). That single lack of courtesy has hurt U.S. interests in the extreme and dangerously further destabilised Pakistan. America’s overbearing attempts at running Pakistan’s policies would in no way help regain the people’s confidence that the war against extremism in the region is not just an American interest but a dire need for Pakistan as well.
First, one must understand the root cause of the present Af/pak crisis which is, as Pashtuns and Balochs blame the black-line i.e. Durrand-line. Inspite of expiration of the agreement between British and Afghans, the legitimate Afghan territories are occupied by Panjab. Likewise, the Satillate Independent State of Afghanistan - Balochistan - is illigally occupied since March, 1948 inspite her declartion of freedom on 11th August, 1948.One must not forget that Afghanistan vehemently protested about the Pakistani action to occupy Afghan territory and she was the first country to refuse the entry of Pakistan in United States. Afghanistan was the first country by supporting the Independence of Balochistan in 1948 and the foremost country to help the Baloch Freedom-fighters by sheltering them on Afghan soil.Now, since 1947 Pakistan has left no stone unturned to keep Afghanistan in stone age. Since 1981 to now, Panjabis have killed 3.5 million Pashtuns (Afghans). The massacre of Pashtuns -Afghans -is continuing in Karachi, Pakhtun-khawa Province, FATA and in the whole Afghanistan on the pretex of Talibans, which in reality are the trained Commandoes of Pakistani Army.In the present scenario, Pakistan is more scared by Afghanistan than India as regards the illegal occupied territories of Afghanistan by Pakistan i.e. Khyber Pakhtun-khawa, part of Baluchistan and FATA. India is regarded as a hinder to future Pakistani plans to massacre the ethnic minorities of Afghanistan i.e. Takjiks, Azbeks, Turkmen, Hazaras, Baluchs and others as the Indian collaboration with Afghans is historical, being their immediate neighbouring nation.Now, without solving the root-cause of AfPak conflict, there shall be no peace in this part of the world. The only solution lies in the bottom line of the freedom of Balochistan and to cease the occupation of Afghan-land by Panjab which can be arranged by United Nations through the "right of self-determination."The democratic, independent and secular Afghanistan and Balochistan are the only guarantee for peace and prosperity not only in South Asia but also in the whole world.
If the readers have problems understanding this writer's logic or grammar, a probable explanation is that he is writing from the deep Sanskrit belt, has never been near the Durand Line and is neither a Baloch, nor a Khan. The Jan is probably the original Janaka, abbreviated with the customary Lodhi Road discretion.
Mr. G. Hektor. Dear Sir, Please don`t make a U-turn like Paki ISI who after committing a crime demand a proof. Yes, my village is about 70 Km from Durrand-line of Balochistan. The British never consulted the Balochs about this evil line, resulting thousands of Kilometer land of Baloch land was annexed with Afghanistan. Unlike Panjabis, the after name of every Baloch is Khan. Do you know the history of Balochistan despite of illegally occupying my mother-land Balochistan? Khan Jan Baloch was the great hero of Baloch nation who fought to regain Shaal i.e. Quetta. If you understand Balochi language, then translate this Balochi sentence in English, " Aeno nunne dey deegre, phugg nunna varis maroe...!!!" Why you blame everything to India, Israel, America and others?