Degrade and Contain: A Responsible ISIL Strategy
Can Operation Inherent Resolve achieve President Obama’s stated goal of degrading and destroying the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)? Those questioning the efficacy of the current U.S. strategy seem to place more emphasis on destroying ISIL than degrading it, as others have suggested that an expansion of the current war is necessary to erase this quasistate from the map. This emphasis on ISIL’s destruction has also led to a slow, but steady decline in public confidence of the operation’s possible success. CNN’s October 29 poll illustrates, somewhat alarmingly, that a growing number of Americans favor “sending troops into combat operations against [ISIL] forces in Iraq or Syria.” President Obama’s decision late last week to send an additional 1,500 troops to Iraq brings the U.S. one step closer to a dangerous and irresponsible escalation.
While this hawkish sentiment is probably well received among neoconservatives and liberal interventionists, committing American grounds troops would be unwise. Doing so would enmesh American forces in a larger regional conflagration that has been sending tremors through the region since 2011. Instead of seeking to excise ISIL, the United States should continue its efforts to degrade its offensive capabilities and emphasize containing militants inside areas they already control. Such a strategy, as Dov Zakheim suggests, will buy time for local allies to begin the long, hard task of liberating the region.
Despite the abhorrent ideology espoused by ISIL and the odious crimes it has committed, it does not pose an existential threat to the United States. American interests in the Arab World are firmly rooted in the preservation of the regional order and its balance of power. Appropriately, it has been regional actors that have hitherto shouldered much of the burden of confronting ISIL after it exploded across the Sunni triangle earlier this year. This summer, at the height of its success, it looked as if Erbil and Baghdad might become new fronts as the peshmerga, Iraqi security forces, and local militias frantically tried to halt ISIL’s advance.
The strategic imperative that ultimately necessitated the American air campaign against ISIL was a direct threat to the integrity of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi state. The conquest of this territory would have given ISIL control of oil refineries in the north, strategic position on the Turkish border and exacerbated an unstable security situation in southern Iraq. The deployment of American airpower in support of coalition allies has proven instrumental in blunting this offensive over the last few months, providing the beleaguered defenders the crucial respite needed to organize a counterattack.
Since August, the degradation of ISIL’s operational capabilities has been made evident. Coalition forces have won victories in northern and central Iraq and even the all-out thrust towards Kobane appears to have stalled, where defenders have begun to slowly roll back ISIL’s gains in the city. The loss of momentum has also been accompanied by an equally devastating loss of prestige, as the myth of an invincible caliphate has been shattered. As Sean Mirski recently wrote in the National Interest, the establishment of an ISIL statelet on the periphery of Iraq and Syria ultimately made it more vulnerable to defeat. “Its statehood has brought it fame, funding and foreign fighters,” Mirski asserts, “but it has also established fixed assets that the United States and its allies can easily hold at risk.” Surrounded on all sides by adversaries, ISIL’s ability to project power across the Iraqi and Syrian deserts has been effectively neutered by U.S. airpower.
While the highpoint of ISIL’s threat is likely over, coalition forces are months away from being able to launch an effective counterattack to liberate the core of occupied territory. The questionable readiness of coalition allies has given credence to the narrative that American boots on the ground will ultimately be needed. Such an intervention would have limited strategic value and involve an open-ended American commitment as peacemaker and security guarantor. By insisting upon the destruction of ISIL, the United States is pursuing a political objective that does not align with its vital interests in the Arab World.