4. Go After ISIL’s Funding Stream: Just like any organization worldwide, the Islamic State needs money if it has any hope in expanding the borders of their caliphate. Launching a full-scale and uncompromising economic war against the group is therefore a fundamental element in any U.S. counterterrorism campaign.

Since 9/11, the U.S. Treasury Department has exponentially improved its ability to find the money pipelines that support terrorist groups overseas, and destroy those pipelines before further damage is done. Treasury’s August 6, 2014 designation of three individuals (2 Kuwaitis and 1 Algerian) who were found to have advocated, facilitated, and donated significant funds to the Islamic State is an illustration of the non-military tools that the U.S. Government can use to weaken a terrorist group. More of these designations need to occur, and the U.S. Government needs to demand that the Gulf states put similar financial restrictions in place.

Unconditionally pursuing donors will not bankrupt the Islamic State; indeed, one of the factors that distinguishes ISIL from other terrorist organizations and makes the group so versatile and dangerous is its ability to tap into sources of funding outside of the donor network (this has been done through taxation of local businesses, extortion of individuals, ransoms, bank robberies, and the export of cheap crude oil on the black market). Obstructing donations in the Gulf won’t do anything to hinder the millions of dollars that ISIL receives each week through other channels. It will, however, put a dent in their bank accounts.

5. Pursue the Islamic State in Syria: “[C]an they (ISIL) be defeated without addressing that part of their organization which resides in Syria? The answer is no. That will have to be addressed on both sides of what is essentially at this point a nonexistent border.”

Those were the words of Gen. Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when asked whether the Islamic State can effectively be defeated without addressing its operational presence in Syria. It’s difficult to argue that his assessment is faulty: acting kinetically in Iraq without doing the same in Syria is akin to fixing half of the roof on a rainy day. Sure, part of the roof is repaired, but the rain will still pour into the house. In the case of the Islamic State, all of the air strikes in the world around Mosul, Tikrit, Tel Afar, and Fallujah won’t do much to compress the space that ISIL fighters will continue to have in eastern and northern Syria. In fact, it may only strengthen ISIL’s presence inside Syria as its foot soldiers travel towards its safe-haven further west.

The White House is beginning to embrace the same argument that Chairman Dempsey used last Thursday. In his own news conference with reporters, Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes was unequivocal on the need to at the least debate the use of U.S. military force in Syria. “If we see plotting against Americans, we see a threat to the U.S. emanating from anywhere, we stand ready to take action against that threat,” Rhodes said. “We've made very clear time and again that if you come after Americans, we're going to come after you wherever you are, and that's what's going to guide our planning in the days to come.”

The U.S. intelligence community and the Defense Department are already doing the legwork required before President Obama gives the go-ahead for U.S. air strikes on the other side of the Syrian-Iraqi border. U.S. reconnaissance aircraft are flying in Syrian airspace scouring for targets, improving their understanding of the order of battle, and compiling more accurate information as to how the Islamic State operates, where its bases are located, and where its leaders hide. If this is a preclude to deeper U.S. engagement, then the president is cognizant of the fact that the entire “caliphate” must be confronted in order to exert the kind of pressure that will degrade their momentum.

6. Get Serious About Arming the Moderate Syrian Opposition: Over the long term, the cheapest and most risk-free strategy that the United States can pursue is developing a collection of effective and lasting relationships with the people who actually live in the region. The U.S. military has a trusted set of friends in Iraq in the Kurdish peshmerga, but the situation is far more complicated in Syria. The moderate opposition of the Free Syrian Army, once the vanguard of the revolt against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, is now caught between two enemies (Assad and ISIL) that are equally existential to the movement’s staying power. It will be all but impossible for the United States to adequately degrade ISIL’s capacity to inflict violence in Syria unless it can enlist assistance from the people that call the area home.

The Central Intelligence Agency has been training and advising moderate Syrian rebels in Jordan for at least a year. This program, however, is small and is designed as much to recruit Syrians for intelligence on ISIL as it is to improve the FSA’s fighting capability relative to jihadist brigades. The Obama administration recognizes that the training effort needs to expand, which is why the White House has requested from Congress $500 million for a train-and-equip mission run by the Defense Department. But because the funding request is tied to a normal budget request, it could be months before the money is approved and appropriated. If the administration’s goal is to build up a grassroots moderate opposition before it’s too late, it may want to think about seeking an emergency funding request. ISIL is not waiting to conquer more territory in Syria; the United States should not wait either.

Admittedly, none of these recommendations are innovative or groundbreaking. Republicans and some Democrats in Congress have been advocating for many of these steps for a long time, and some within the White House at the present time are indisputably talking about the viability and workability of the options presented.

Proposing bullet-points for an anti-ISIL strategy is easy, but implementing them will not be. U.S. personnel, particularly the dedicated special operators who are tasked with carrying the policy out, will be at some degree of risk. In Washington, the entire national security bureaucracy will need to exhibit unity of effort to minimize any problems that may arise or any turf battles that may occur. President Obama will need to personally invest in the policy, enlist the support of the American people, and explain to the public and to the people’s representatives in Congress in clear and unambiguous terms why such an ambitious strategy is needed to counter the Islamic State.

Before reflexively dismissing deeper U.S. involvement in a region that most Americans would prefer to write off, it’s imperative for all of us to ask whether the alternative—the status quo—is any better for U.S. security in that part of the world. From the looks of the headlines in Iraq and Syria, the answer should be obvious.

Daniel R. DePetris is a senior associate editor at the Journal on Terrorism and Security Analysis. He has also written for CNN.com, Small Wars Journal and The Diplomat.

Image: Flickr/Official U.S. Air Force/CC by-nc 2.0