A New U.S. Strategy for Syria

America will need to signal some organizing principles, some clearer set of objectives, around which to rally the fissiparous stakeholders.

It is easy, as the many commentaries demonstrate, to bemoan the political, social, cultural and humanitarian tragedy in Syria and point to the inconsistency and fecklessness of U.S. policy in Syria as a cause. Harder by far is to identify a better, more coherent strategy. The “if only we had” alternative may be good politics but many of the proffered alternatives depend on unlikely assumptions and are almost certainly better at dinner party debates than they would have been in real policy. Had the United States and its allies intervened earlier, had it taken military action when Bashar al-Assad crossed President Obama’s red line on the use of chemical weapons, and (most important) had the United States and its European allies armed, trained and helped organize the moderate opposition, the Syrian insurgents would at least have had the possibility of defeating Assad early on and establishing a liberal, even democratic, regime.

Perhaps. Many skeptical specialists doubt that happy result: there never was a viable, operational liberal or moderate opposition; the moderates were too few, too fractured and too implausible as a militarily or even politically successful force; and absent massive external intercession, the Free Syrian Army (including its constituent militias and rival militias) was always a feeble force with an improbable victory.

Whatever the might-have-beens, the current choices are far less appealing. In fact, traditional strategic logic inadequately comprehends the complexities of the Syrian dynamics. The policy dilemma began almost immediately after the March 2011 demonstrations against the Assad regime. The celebration was short-lived. The regime cracked down hard not only on the demonstrators but on the ethnic and religious communities that it understood supported them. It had good reason to fear a broader revolt. The large Sunni majority bore deep resentment against the Alawite minority—a Shiite offshoot—that had dominated the political economy, not only for its authoritarianism and corruption, but also for its religious and ethnic repression and violence. By 2013, the demonstrators for a new, liberal democratic regime were outflanked and overwhelmed politically and militarily by the Syrian Army, by Hezbollah forces from Lebanon backing the administration and also by the jihadi Sunni forces, primarily Jabhat al-Nusra (the Al Qaeda offshoot in Syria) and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS or Daesh).

Unlike traditional Bismarckian international balance of power logic in which the adversaries are morally neutral states or polities in some struggle over political and territorial modifications and adjustments to revise or restore the balance of power among them, the adversaries in Syria are moral not just territorial or even solely political antagonists. They are locked in seemingly existential conflicts that cannot easily be compromised and that appear resolvable only by the total conquest of their respective opponents. All of the contestants for power seem to be committed to eviscerating their adversaries in zero-sum fights to the death. Their goal is either total submission or expulsion.

Absent that existential dimension, the removal or containment of Assad would not represent an insurmountable strategic puzzle for the United States and its allies. A pact could be fashioned among the contestants (including terms for an Assad role), pressure and the threat of intervention could be mounted, or he could be removed either by domestic or international protagonists in favor of a suitable substitute. However he and his inner circle have provided little, if any, room for compromise. Their gruesome tactics prescribe killing or maiming every source of resistance and every opposing civilian population, especially Sunnis.

Complicating the underlying Syrian dynamics and strategic logic, each of the antagonists has one or more foreign backers on whom it can rely and, in some cases, for whom it is a proxy. Assad and his Alawite community have the support of Iran and of Shiite Hezbollah from Lebanon, notwithstanding that in either place the Alawites would be deemed unacceptable deviants from true Shiism, but as against Sunnis in general and fundamentalist Sunnis, they are brothers or at least cousins. Daesh has the direct backing of some individual Gulf Arab Sunni fundamentalists. The Saudis and other Gulf states do not back Daesh directly but do so indirectly by providing weapons and funds to non-jihadi Wahabis and Salafists implacably opposed to Assad.

The attempt to forge from the anti-Assad mélange an indigenous, organized non-jihadi Syrian fighting force proved unworkable and unraveled, as its various components fragmented, fought one another, and (some) defected to Daesh or al-Nusra. Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan insists on Assad’s removal, as does the United States and (less vigorously) its European allies but neither has a compelling anti-Assad military partner.