Nuclear Power Play: How North Korea Uses U.S. Fears to Gain Leverage
Despite mounting international pressure, North Korea is resolutely advancing toward achieving nuclear deterrent against the United States. The rapid pace of its nuclear development has caused impatience on the side of the United States and its allies, and one recurring theme in recent debates is that the international community is “running out of time.”
However, this mindset is incorrect. Due to two narratives established by the post–Cold War proliferation studies, which have dealt with the issue of emerging nuclear powers, the implication of Pyongyang’s limited nuclear capability has been overestimated and we have cornered ourselves into an unnecessarily disadvantageous position. As some experts have noted, North Korea’s nuclear ICBM is not a game changer. It doesn’t make a cataclysmic shift in the East-Asian strategic environment imminent, and eventual denuclearization is still possible. There is no need to prematurely resort to a costly preventive-war. Only by reversing those narratives can we deal with this national-security issue more easily rather than in a time-pressured manner.
What has Pyongyang achieved?
North Korea is about to acquire the technological capability to produce nuclear-tipped missiles capable of hitting the continental United States. In terms of deterrence, however, what can accrue to North Korea from achieving and possessing nuclear ICBMs is limited—especially since such a rudimentary capability is vulnerable to the adversary’s nuclear first-strike. It cannot be anything but a form of existential deterrence, which rests not on the certainty of nuclear retaliation but on the uncertainty perceived by the adversary, and its deterrent effect is, by nature, vague and unreliable—especially in the eyes of the possessor. Even more, there is no way that this capability can serve as an effective tool of compellence to make significant gains, like relieving sanctions vis-à-vis more established nuclear powers.
Realizing this, every other state involved in mutual nuclear deterrence has proceeded beyond such a rudimentary capability and, at minimum, sought an assured retaliatory capability, which is enough for ensuring that the possessor can implement nuclear counterattacks—even after absorbing the adversary’s first strike. There is no reason to expect otherwise for Pyongyang. In this sense, North Korea’s nuclear development is not nearing its completion.
If North Korea should eventually acquire an assured retaliatory capability against the United States, then that capability could bring much significant deterrent effects. But the North must be a long way from assured retaliatory capability, because the United States has the most elaborated nuclear war-fighting capability in the world. To achieve that goal, the North’s nuclear forces must be reliable and survivable enough to ride out the massive U.S. counterforce first-strike and they must be able to penetrate missile-defense shields. Additionally, North Korea must have a well-protected command and control architecture as well as institutional setups and operational procedures capable of functioning even under the chaos caused by the adversary’s nuclear attacks. Given that even China has been worrying about the assuredness of its retaliatory capability vis-à-vis the United States, it must be extremely difficult for Pyongyang to achieve all of those requirements. And it is possible for the United States and its allies to prevent the country from having confidence on assuredness of its capability for a long while.
As Pyongyang continues its nuclear development, it has to endure international isolation and sanctions. Moreover, even acquiring an assured retaliatory capability will not enable Pyongyang to end this ordeal through nuclear compellence, since it doesn’t change the fact that its nuclear first-use will surely be met with devastating retaliation from the United States. We can afford to wait for the Kim regime to finally realize that its crown jewel cannot produce much strategic benefits as expected.
Why have we regarded Pyongyang’s acquisition of such a capability, which constitutes only a primary milestone in a quest for effective nuclear deterrent, as a game changer? One plausible reason is that, as Vipin Narang pointed out, a deep existential bias narrative established in proliferation studies has permeated our thinking. Under this bias, mere possession of even a few nuclear weapons is supposed to be enough to deter a stronger nuclear adversary, and therefore details of force postures or nuclear superiority are regarded as irrelevant. This line of thinking is often advocated by strategic communities of emerging nuclear powers like India and Pakistan, because it is useful to offset their stronger rival’s advance in nuclear development. Premised on this thinking, mere possession of a few nuclear ICBMs would enable the North to deter the superior United States.