The Misplaced Burden-Sharing Fight
As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump insisted that U.S. allies were receiving a cheap-ride on American security guarantees. He suggested that they pay more, otherwise, Washington might not feel compelled to meet U.S. treaty obligations. Now that Trump has been elected, there is rising anxiety among American allies that such a scenario might come to pass. Exposed allies like South Korea feel this most acutely; within twenty-four hours of Trump’s victory, South Korea’s president, Park Geun-Hye, made sure to phone Trump.
There is a necessary debate to be had with U.S. allies on burden-sharing. Unfortunately, Trump to date has cast the debate in a bean-counting light: how much do allies pay for this or that American capability? This could easily degenerate into a he-said-she-said contest over who paid how much for this lightbulb or that paperclip. While there is space for America’s wealthiest allies to pay more, such a frame casts the U.S. military in a mercenary role at odds with the liberal values that underpin most American alliances. This is why Trump’s claim that America should have taken Iraqi oil fell so afoul of the foreign policy community; it smacked of war spoils-taking.
Such bean-counting misses the real issue, which is allies’ willingness to spend more of their own resources on their own defense and power projection; their commitment to developing hi-tech, highly trained forces capable of inter-operating with the contemporary American military; and their general strategic seriousness.
Burden-Sharing Conflicts Are Endemic to Alliances
As early as President Eisenhower’s “New Look,” the United States has tangled with European members of NATO especially over their proper contributions to the larger effort. Such issues have also cropped up regarding America’s Asian allies since the 1980s. At that time, Japan was thought to be overtaking the United States, in part because its military spending was so low due to the American guarantee. Later, as North Korea nearly collapsed in the wake of the Cold War, this critique was expanded to South Korea. Writers at the National Interest have been at the forefront of these arguments.
The numbers are indeed disturbing. Only four of twenty-eight NATO members meet the recommended defense-spending floor of two percent of GDP. Japan spends an astonishing one percent of GDP on defense, while South Korea spends around one-half to one-third of what it otherwise would against the North Korean threat. All these states are wealthy enough to spend more. American officials have lobbied for this for years, and Trump may be the “unpredictable” figure necessary to finally achieve this — by threat unfortunately, if not by persuasion.
Improving these numbers in aggregate is significantly more important than zero-sum fights over allied payments to the United States, which Trump has highlighted. Burden sharing agreements get very complicated very quickly. It is difficult to determine the precise nature of expenses as well, given hard-to-calculate opportunity costs for land use, road construction, environmental damage, and so on. Many U.S. allies could indeed pay more, and for G-20 allies like Britain or Japan, there is really no excuse for the relationship not to be at least 50-50. But treating even close U.S. allies as clients-for-cash is sure to provoke a domestic backlash over what would be portrayed as a shakedown. More importantly, it misses the forest for the trees: the larger American interest in pushing allies to spend, do, and think more themselves. The real goal is not to tear down U.S. alliances over demands for cash, but to build them up through greater allied seriousness of purpose.
Expanding Allied Capabilities and Imaginations
Trump’s goal should be to encourage U.S. allies to spend more of their own resources on forces and doctrine. Sure, allies could pay the United States more, but far more valuable would be their own ability to carry more of the load. Multilateral operations carry greater international credibility, relieve operational tempo stress on the U.S. military, and signal to opponents that they face a full-bodied international coalition of serious, committed democracies — not just the Americans yet again. The failure of Britain and France to sustain their air operations over Libya in 2011 is emblematic of allied atrophy, as was the U.S. support required by many allies who sent forces to Iraq and Afghanistan.