Trump Needs to Spell out His Strategy for Africa—Before It's Too Late

As Chinese economic and political ties across Africa grow, increasingly stagnant U.S. policy towards the continent threatens to undermine both American and African interests.

Proponents of stronger U.S.-Africa relations seemingly had much to celebrate in September. At a working lunch with African Leaders, President Donald Trump lauded Africa’s “tremendous business potential,” and highlighted a compact signed between Côte d’Ivoire and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) that promises to improve access to secondary education and infrastructure. The president’s comments came hot on the heels of Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Tom Shannon’s speech at a United States Institute of Peace symposium in which he affirmed that African affairs “touch U.S. interests” globally. Both Trump and Shannon emphasized that African leaders should make deeper commitments to solving the continent’s security challenges, but also reassured those present that U.S. support in the region would remain strong.

While these statements are certainly welcomed by African leaders and U.S. policymakers, there has been little evidence that the Trump administration plans to seriously engage Africa politically or economically. Trump has yet to nominate an assistant secretary of state for African affairs, and AFRICOM’s role has remained unchanged except for a general increase in Special Forces raids. As Chinese economic and political ties across Africa grow, increasingly stagnant U.S. policy towards the continent threatens to undermine both American and African interests. The Trump administration has the opportunity to revamp this state of affairs before it’s too late.

Economic engagement with Africa has remained largely unchanged since the George W. Bush administration. While, as Ahmed Charai previously wrote in these pages, “Americans enjoy the potential to enter the continent en masse—in business, civil society and security—and trump other powers in both scope and esteem,” no administration in the past few decades has mobilized such an effort. The MCC’s compact with Côte d’Ivoire that Trump referenced is indeed a promising initiative, but the investment is ultimately modest and the country is just one of fifty-three African nations. The last major piece of U.S.-Africa trade legislation, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, was signed in 2000 and is not set for reevaluation until 2025. The only new idea from the Trump administration, repealing the provisions designed to prevent the trade of conflict minerals by executive or legislative means, threatens to harm African economies and stability more than help.

By contrast, Chinese economic engagement with Africa has exploded in recent decades. According to a report from the McKinsey Global Institute, “No other country matches this depth and breadth of [economic] engagement.” Africa-China trade has grown by 20 percent annually, and foreign direct investment has grown 40 percent. There are roughly ten thousand Chinese firms in Africa, which account for 12 percent of the continent’s industrial production and half of internationally contracted construction projects. This expansive growth has resulted in hundreds of thousands of jobs for Africans.

Trump has formulated little policy in regards to Africa, even when presented with the opportunity to combat terrorism. A potential watershed moment, whether to lift sanctions on Sudan, was postponed due to lack of scrutiny on the issue. Not making a decision was the worst outcome for Trump: maintaining the sanctions would have reaffirmed U.S. commitment to human rights in the face of Sudan’s ongoing conflicts in Darfur and beyond, while lifting sanctions would have signaled to potential regional partners that the United States is willing to reward cooperation in combatting terrorism.