This approach has involved an unglamorous process that moved through several stages and required constant adjustments to the road map. It has required us to be willing to work continually to reduce mistrust and improve communication among factions. On sensitive issues, such as increasing ethnic balance in the government or curbing the influence of warlords, it has required living with ambiguity. We have proceeded through a series of moves that did not achieve the ideal outcome all at once, but that steadily moved the society in the right direction. We have been careful not to overreach. This approach has also required us to use American influence to hold individual leaders to their word. In this manner, we have been helpful to Afghans who are seeking to improve their country, without risking instability by pushing for too much change at any one time. We are interested in enduring change that takes place without endangering stability, not rapid change that might provide instant gratification of our hopes but that destabilizes the country and creates more problems than we had before.

This process has been focused on resolving sources of instability in Afghanistan. First, it involved helping Afghans agree on new rules of the game. Political power would be won not through private militias, but by elections. The presence and engagement of the United States encouraged ordinary Afghans to believe in the credibility of this process, and checked or restrained potential troublemakers whose power was rooted in the old order. Second, it has focused on dismantling the infrastructure of civil war--the militias themselves. We helped broker an agreement that has resulted in the cantonment of 97 percent of heavy weapons held by militia leaders with the national army and the disarmament of about 75 percent of the fighters in formal militias. Third, it involved accelerating the development of national institutions, particularly the army and police. Fourth, even as the United States stepped up the coalition's efforts against the Taliban insurgency, we kept the door open for individuals who were fighting the new government but had not committed crimes themselves to give up their fight and reconcile. Fifth, we invested major resources in improving the prospects of the Afghan people, thereby validating their belief in democratic institutions.

4) The United States must size and configure its footprint to avoid creating unnecessary friction or over-reliance on any one instrument of policy.

A frequent criticism of the international community's military presence in Afghanistan has been that it was too small. Though partly valid early on, this point obscures another equally valid one: Too large a military presence can have unintended consequences, imperiling the overall mission. For any country, the presence of foreign troops is profoundly unnatural. It can lead to the foreign force being drawn into conflicts at the local level or to frictions that inadvertently alienate the people. Also, the greater the presence of our military forces, the greater the danger that we will try to solve all of Afghanistan's problems ourselves and divert resources and focus from the main task: enabling the development of Afghan institutions and capabilities as rapidly as possible. In other post-conflict situations, too large a foreign military presence has resulted in an unhealthy dependency that leads local security and other capabilities to atrophy or fail to develop. The right amount of international security presence can promote political engagement by creating an environment that allows all sides to engage in dialogue internally.

Wise use of security forces is crucial, for it is important to avoid excessive reliance on any one instrument of policy. Because of the effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces, many commentators reflexively urged us to turn to the military to solve every problem in post-conflict situations in Afghanistan. Taking this approach is a mistake. Though we should never rule out the use of the military instrument if necessary and appropriate, this habit of mind underestimates what can be achieved--and what can be achieved better--by the patient but determined and combined use of other instruments, including diplomacy, economic incentives and political engagement.

At the end of the day, the leaders and factions of any country must come to terms with each other--to reach an agreement on the rules by which power and influence will be distributed. This is a goal that will be achieved in a more lasting way if it is reached politically, not imposed by force from without. In Afghanistan, the United States, by virtue of its power and the desire of local leaders and factions to have close ties to us, is in a strong position to assist in resolving contentious issues through political means.

5) Post-conflict reconstruction involves the reconstitution of a country's political elite. Success depends on the emergence of an elite that has roots in the society and the vision and capability to build a new and better political order.

In Afghanistan we have faced a challenging situation in which we are helping a country go through a transition from an era when leadership was based on command of armed groups to a period when leaders must respond to popular aspirations and deliver social and economic results.

When I speak publicly and privately to Afghan leaders, I often recite a checklist of the necessary conditions for such success. They include a democratic government, an enlightened civil society, a free press, security forces responsive to legitimate political authority, the rule of law, respect for minority rights, a free-market economy and other key requirements. This list creates an imposing agenda for a country that has had all its institutions destroyed by war and extremism during the past quarter century. It also highlights the fact that a key challenge is finding Afghans who can rebuild and run such institutions. Afghanistan is not without the people needed to meet this challenge--but they are scarce in comparison to the demand. Rapidly building up Afghan human capital--both through aggressive training programs and enabling the return of elements of the Afghan diaspora--is essential.

This has required a strategy to curb warlordism. We worked with President Karzai to persuade major regional leaders to give up their arms in exchange for an opportunity to become legitimate political actors, either through appointments to new positions or through entry into electoral politics. This was a difficult, contentious and sometimes risky process that combined assertion through the shadow effect of military power and negotiation by the national government, supported by the international community. Those who commanded private militias were persuaded to change their behavior if they wished to make the transition to the new era. At the same time, we made it clear that those who conduct themselves as warlords will not have a position of power and prestige in the new Afghanistan. The objective was to make the elites from the period of civil war into stakeholders in the new order, as well as to train and empower new elites. Though this has been a difficult transition, it has been carried out largely by political means, and it has seen considerable success.

6) Effective communication is vital to the success of any reconstruction program.

In Afghanistan, the U.S. mission has energetically reached out to the Afghan people to explain our policies. The key is to explain--persistently and consistently--our vision and goals and why we are doing what we are doing in every main line of our activities.

I have granted dozens of interviews and routinely met with local Afghan media, and I have given scores of speeches at public events. In addition, the U.S. mission initiated a series of radio addresses to the Afghan people in which I described the U.S. program to accelerate progress in Afghanistan, the U.S. vision for its partnership with the Afghan people, and the U.S. policy toward disarming militias and assisting Afghanistan's democratic transition. These speeches, as well as my local media appearances, were conducted in Dari. We recorded my radio addresses on CDs and distributed them to all Afghan government and private radio stations, which gave them a nationwide airing. Many Afghans have told me that our communications effort has played an important role in creating both hope and realistic expectations among the people. At the same time, I met widely with provincial and local leaders to communicate U.S. policy through the traditional networks of Afghan social leaders.

It is essential not just to talk with elites, but also to engage in a political dialogue with the entire nation we are trying to help. The importance was evident with respect to the issue of disarming militias, which many Afghans told me was the top priority for ordinary civilians. This problem could not be solved overnight, particularly because we had to train a new army and police force to fill the vacuum if militias were to be disarmed. In my radio address on this subject, I explained the process that we were pursuing to negotiate disarmament and build new security forces. Afghans told me that this explanation of our approach resulted in greater patience. It also won us greater credibility as Afghans watched their government and the international community deliver as promised.

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