February 28, 1996 marked the fifth anniversary of the U.S.-led
coalition's defeat of Iraq, a military triumph that resulted in the
liberation of Kuwait and the extension of U.S. power and influence in
the Persian Gulf. The following month, however, marked a different
anniversary, one less gratifying to American self-esteem. For it was
in March 1991 that Saddam Hussein brutally suppressed rebellions by
Iraqi Kurds and Shi'a while the American president and other Western
leaders passively looked on, out of respect for Iraq's territorial
integrity.
The U.S. commitment to the territorial integrity of Iraq was mistaken
then and remains ill-considered now. Opponents of Iraq's
dismemberment argue that an intact Iraq is necessary to balance Iran,
that a separate Kurdish state would destabilize Iraq's neighbors, and
that a new Shi'a entity would tilt toward Tehran. In reality,
however, an Iraqi break-up would pose little threat to U.S. allies,
including Turkey with its large Kurdish population. Iran's
ideological appeal to Iraqi Shi'a is limited at best, and any tilt in
the regional balance of conventional forces in favor of Iran could be
easily countered by U.S. power. On the positive side of the ledger,
the division of Iraq into three entities would eliminate the Iraqi
threat to the oil-rich Gulf states, end the Ba'athi quest for nuclear
weapons, free the Shi'a and Kurds from oppression, and remove Baghdad
from the list of revisionist rogue states. Hence, if the central
government in Iraq collapses, the United States should support the
division of Iraq into separate Kurdish, Sunni Muslim, and Shi'a
Muslim entities, rather than try to restore overall authority to a
new regime in Baghdad.
