Musharraf also hesitates to address seriously the future role and mission of the Pakistani army. For more than fifty years, young cadets-including Musharraf himself-have been taught in Pakistan's military academies that their holy mission was the liberation of all of Kashmir and that the central purpose of Pakistan itself was to further this task. Beginning in 1947, Pakistani attempts to accomplish this directly by military force have failed. Thus thwarted, in the past decade and a half, Pakistan has used terror as an instrument of attempted change in Jammu and Kashmir. This too has not succeeded.

When faced with a fruitless strategy, a government has three choices. It can stick with its losing strategy, develop a new strategy or change objectives. In my judgment, Pakistan has not yet made a strategic shift away from its long-time policies of territorial acquisition and cross-border terrorism. Although Pakistan has reduced its effort to push killers across the Kashmiri border, Musharraf implicitly holds out the possibility of Pakistan resuming terror against India if the bilateral talks with New Delhi do not produce favorable results regarding Kashmir. This was the import of one of his final public statements in India during his largely successful April visit there. The terrorist infrastructure inside Pakistan--the camps and the instructors, the weapons caches, the communications capabilities, the terrorists themselves-is still in place.

Nevertheless, Islamabad holds a losing hand. The Indian government will give up no territory it now controls, including in Jammu and Kashmir. Officially, India remains committed to the return of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir to India. But the Indian elite would likely settle for the permanent international border being drawn along the current Line of Control. Therefore, unless the Pakistani government and the army change for good their objective and accept the current division of territory, the Kashmir dispute will go on for a very long time. Cross-border terrorist violence from Pakistan against India could resume.

The two countries that would be most negatively affected by a convulsion within Pakistan, a country with dozens of nuclear weapons, are India and the United States. Bush Administration policy regarding Pakistan has been adept and effective to this point, but that could change tomorrow if Musharraf is murdered. This is why both India and the United States have such a stake in the emergence of a democratic, stable and prosperous Pakistan. Washington and New Delhi should have a sustained secret dialogue on how best to promote that historic goal.

What is the way forward?

Since the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration has radically altered U.S. policy toward the Greater Middle East. Previous administrations focused on attempting to manage existing conflicts while supporting autocratic regimes. That approach offered neither lasting stability nor peace to the region or the world at large. George W. Bush believes that the promotion of democracy and freedom is the central strategic concept offering a serious, long-term alternative to Islamic extremism. In my judgment, he is right. As this decade progresses, India will be an ever more active partner with the United States in this noble pursuit, as a central part of the continuing transformation of U.S.-Indian relations, based in addition on largely congruent vital national interests.

Essay Types: Essay