The Kremlin's Collapsing Eurasian Sandcastle

Russia's proposed Eurasian Union is unrealistic and bad for its own interests.

Vladimir Putin’s dream of creating a Eurasian Union is about to breathe its last breath.

Over the past several weeks, Russia has made headlines with its bullying of Ukraine for the latter’s intention to sign an association agreement with the European Union in November. Frantic to keep for themselves what would be the crown jewel of the potential Eurasian Union, Russia has in the past month ordered intense checks of all Ukrainian goods entering Russia, banned imports of Ukrainian chocolate and warned Ukraine that it would lose its status as a “strategic partner” and face “defensive measures” should it sign the Agreement.

Russia knows very well that should Ukraine sign the EU Association Agreement, it will no longer have the tools to incorporate Ukraine into the Customs Union, thus making further political integration into the Eurasian Union impossible.

The Eurasian Union has been at the forefront of Putin’s attempts to create an umbrella group for former Soviet nations that would strive for their security, economic prosperity and cultural closeness.

The idea of seeing Russia as the core of a new geopolitical center that would act as a bridge between West and East has long been an attractive idea to many Russians and is a project that Russian rulers have promoted for centuries. The idea of Great Russia has been twice realized in history, first as the Russian Empire (1721-1917) and then as the Soviet Union (1922-1991). Putin has himself hoped for Russia to reacquire that position, and has dreamt of resurrecting a geopolitical giant that would balance America, the EU and China in the twenty-first century.

Putin’s plan was to consolidate “willing” countries around the already existing Customs Union trade block of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and, following the example of EU integration, slowly transform into a political unit. But Moscow’s project was immature and flawed from the very beginning.

First, the Eurasian Union lacks the kind of strong ideology that was the cornerstone of the Soviet project. Bolshevism and the promise of the great Communist tomorrow galvanized both the elites and ordinary peoples of the former Russian Empire to endure the harsh road ahead, suffering losses and total lack of political and personal independence. But such an ideology does not exist to unite the Eurasian Union. The concept of “Eurasianism,” is based on the contraposition of Russia to the West in the sense of culture, power and existential meaning but does not provide for a unified solution to the problems that the post-Soviet states face. Rather, Putin wanted to use Eurasianist ideology solely for a pure and direct Empire-like projection of Russia and Russianness onto Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

But as it is a Russian vision, the Eurasian Union would bear the flaws of modern Russia: neglect of human rights, selective justice and omnivorous corruption. As compared to the European Union, the example on which Putin wanted to base his Union, Russia also lacks the tradition of following established rules. This understandably engenders fears and doubts among the potential members for the integrity of their sovereignty and, in the case of Ukraine, pushes them towards the more secure embrace of already established alternatives. Ukraine now sees its economic future with Europe, while at the other end of the old Soviet space, Kyrgyzstan would be ill advised to join the Eurasian Union, as it would lose much of the benefits it receives from Chinese trade.

A further weakness in the Eurasian plan is the massive difference between the economic potentials of Russia and the Central Asian states. Out of the five Central Asian states, Kazakhstan, the most economically advanced, is already a part of Customs Union, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have shown no interest in integrating with Russia, thus leaving two poor, but “willing” nations, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The establishment of a Eurasian Union with those states that would make Russia accountable for balancing the inequalities of economic development through massive monetary transfers, as the European Union has done recently with southern European states like Greece and, in the past, most of the eastern European states. Such transfers would likely aggravate the economic situation in Russia, slowing down economic development and creating massive social liabilities; additional expenses would not be approved by the vast majority of even the most conservative, Soviet-nostalgic population.

Yet another obstacle is Russia’s resurgent nationalism. The old Soviet idea of “the friendship of nations” has long since faded and, over the last decade, Russian support of nationalist attitudes toward work migrants from Central Asian states has grown substantially. This has produced tensions in the big cities, regular assaults on immigrants by nationalist radicals and, more commonly, an overt intolerance of migrants. It also makes the question of integration with those Central Asian nations a sticky one.

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