But Thailand’s 2014 coup and the regime’s subsequent suppression of public dissent are inconsistent with American sensibilities, severely complicating Washington’s relations with Bangkok. The United States should certainly not approve of such moves, and should strive to shift Thailand back on a path to civilian rule and orderly civil-military relations. But just as the United States nonetheless maintained coordination and interaction with the Egyptian military in the wake of its toppling of Mohammed Morsi, strategic calculations should be integrated into our handling of Thailand.

Long-Term: Building New Approaches

At the end of the day, these moves underscore that the United States cannot, by itself, manage, much less resolve, the South China Sea issue. But as President Trump indicated at the recent World Economic Forum, “America first” is not the same as America alone. Similarly, while there are many things that America can do to help balance China, more can be achieved in conjunction with other states.

The nascent “quad” of the United States, Japan, Australia and India offers a potential new path for addressing some of the South China Sea issues. When officials from the four states met during President Trump’s November circuit of Asia, it gave new life to the concept, which has hibernated for nearly a decade.

The “quad” is not—and should not be—an effort at creating a regional-alliance structure. The four states have very divergent views on security, as well as national constraints on their ability to interoperate. But facilitating political and diplomatic coordination among these states, and perhaps advancing certain economic and political policies jointly, can provide a significant underpinning for individual- and bilateral-security moves.

For example, making clear that all four states believe in freedom of the seas and reject the idiosyncratic Chinese interpretation is a political, not a military, move, which could then be buttressed by individual national naval activities. Simply having all four nations maintain a steadfast position on the importance of keeping the region’s sea lanes open is likely to have salutary effects.

At the same time, should China choose to adjust its approach and refrain from further destabilizing the region with its artificial island construction efforts, an informal “quad” is far better placed to respond positively than a formal alliance which presupposes incipient hostilities.

Prospects: Still a Question Mark

The Trump administration continues to be a work-in-progress. For that matter, so is Xi Jinping’s administration. We have yet to fully understand the impact of the personnel changes announced in the 19th Party Congress, including the elevation of Yang Jiechi to the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and Wang Huning to the Politburo Standing Committee. The next several years may see a mutual focus on domestic economic development, and, if so, then there will be a significant likelihood of cooperation.

But the past decade suggests that there is growing friction in the South China Sea, and recent events give us little reason to believe that trend is changing. What will follow in the wake of the USS Hopper FONOPs remains to be seen, but it might be best to batten the hatches.

Dean Cheng is a senior research fellow in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.