Storming out of a recent Security Council meeting after China and Russia vetoed a resolution condemning Syria's ruthless clampdown on protestors, America's U.N. ambassador Susan Rice expressed Washington’s "outrage" and labeled the veto “a cheap ruse by those who would rather sell arms to the Syrian regime than stand with the Syrian people."
But Russian ambassador Vitaly Churkin termed the threat of heightened sanctions "unacceptable" given that it reflected a "philosophy of confrontation." Churkin has criticized the United States and the EU for their previous actions in Libya—turning a UN resolution against Muammar Qaddafi, designed to protect civilians, into a bombing campaign aimed at regime change. In fact, some analysts perceived the veto on Syria as a Russian act of revenge attributable to what many have labeled a "Libyan Hangover."
But Russian policy towards the Assad regime is grounded more in Russia's strategic interest in maintaining and perhaps expanding its influence in the Middle East as part of its attempt to revitalize its international status vis-a-vis the West. This desire is not new. It drove the Soviet Union's policy towards Syria throughout the Cold War under similar circumstances.
As the Cold War set upon the Middle East, it brought together two unlikely allies—Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. Initially, the Soviet Union generated little appeal among the mostly conservative Arab states, and Nasser’s strong Arab nationalism generated skepticism about any new power with possible designs on the region. And Khrushchev generally dismissed Nasser’s Egyptian rebellion as just another military coup that lacked an appropriate hostility to the bourgeoisie.
But when Britain forged the Baghdad Pact, an alliance with friendly Muslim countries (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan) pieced together under the guise of an anti-Soviet bulwark, Nasser became agitated. The West seemed bent on thwarting his nationalist goals throughout the Middle East. He needed arms to counter Israel’s weapons buildup. President Eisenhower had promised them but now seemed disinclined to fulfill the promise. So a seething Nasser turned to Moscow. Khrushchev was only too happy to oblige. He saw an opportunity: Ship arms to Nasser and gain a foothold in the Middle East. Such a foothold had been a Russian dream since the days of the czars.
Before long, the struggle for the Middle East centered on Syria, which became the battleground state for two regional forces—Arab nationalists supported by the Soviet Union and more Western-friendly regimes wooed and supported by the United States.
The Soviet Union viewed Syria as a key state to influence Levantine politics (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Israel) and inflame Arab nationalist sentiment, given that Damascus had been renowned as the cradle of Arab nationalism. But Syria's polarized multi-party system impeded Moscow's efforts to hold sway over Syrian politics. Broadly speaking, the Soviet Union relied on its military aid to Syria and its charismatic and powerful communist ally Khalid Baqdash to manipulate Syrian politics. Moscow's policy on Damascus took a sharp turn when the Ba'ath party seized power in 1963. Not only did Russia try to make Syria a client state; it also attempted to use Damascus as a launch pad to enhance its regional standing at the expense of the West. In May 1967, with the United States preoccupied with Southeast Asia, Moscow delivered a false alarm to Egypt. It warned that Israel was massing troops on the Israel-Syria border in preparation for an invasion. The Soviet leadership mistakenly reckoned that an Arab-Israeli confrontation would benefit Moscow. As it turned out, Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel, and Moscow's attempts at staving off a Syrian defeat were reduced to mere vocal threats.
The 1970 ascension of Hafiz al-Assad to Syrian leadership changed the dynamics of the Soviet-Syrian relationship. The Soviets wanted Syrian malleability and deference to Moscow, but Assad wanted national autonomy. The resulting tensions marked Soviet-Syrian relations until the early 1980s. In 1976, Assad intervened in Lebanon against Soviet wishes. Without consulting the Soviets, he massed troops on the Jordanian-Syrian border in 1980 and moved Soviet missiles into Lebanon in 1981. Only in the aftermath of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 did Syria defer to Soviet wishes. Assad recognized that his policy of strategic parity with Israel had little chance of success without sophisticated Soviet weapons. He got them. In 1983, Moscow supplied Damascus with advanced surface-to-surface missiles, the SS-21, much to the chagrin of Washington and Jerusalem.