Faced with the reality of yet another American war in Afghanistan, President Obama made good on his campaign theme, raising troop levels but also setting an initial withdrawal date for July of this year—prompting considerable consternation that the United States might pull back again before finishing the job. That concern lingers, and prospects remain dim for an end to the conflict any time soon.

The war in Afghanistan will not be lost by the military, but it cannot be won by the military either. For Western interests to prevail in that country, Afghans must be offered a viable alternative to drug production and to rule by the Taliban. Only civilians can infuse Afghanistan with the degree of governance and economic prospects necessary to discredit the insurgents. Unfortunately, America’s dismal record as a nation builder and the abject failure of USAID to make the most of the development funds at its disposal are cause for serious concern.

USAID, which transformed itself into a contract manager after its personnel levels were decimated by the Congress in the 1990s, simply does not have the people to ensure that its contractors, especially local Afghan contractors and subcontractors, are employing their resources efficiently. Worse, perhaps, they cannot assure themselves, or anyone else, that Afghans can absorb the vast amounts of money coming into the country without corrupting the fabric of government and society even beyond acceptable local standards. The influx of billions of dollars after years of relative neglect and deepening poverty has left Afghanistan vulnerable to financial chicanery. Money continues to pour out of the country as quickly as it comes in; the national budget is a pittance compared with both the unprecedented levels of development aid that it cannot absorb and the drug revenues it cannot control. It is hard to be optimistic about Afghanistan’s future, or about America’s ability to shape it.

Failure in Afghanistan could spell the death of NATO, whose original mission to defend the West against the Soviet Union has long since vanished, and at the very time that its credibility is already being threatened by a newly energized (in all senses of that term) Russia. China, whose border touches on Afghanistan, would also become emboldened in the face of an American failure there, while the Central Asian Muslim republics could well become radicalized by the spread of Islamist extremism. So too could Pakistan, whose internal fissures seem to be growing daily. A more or less permanent Afghan narco-state, too, would have far greater implications for international security than Colombia ever did. The Colombian FARC never reached beyond South America’s borders, apart from a few scattered sympathizers in Europe. Al Qaeda was Afghanistan’s and the Taliban’s leech, sucking power and territory from which to launch its mad schemes for international terror. Whether such a situation could repeat itself is not a matter of speculation. Unless the United States and its allies maintain their focus on both their military and civilian efforts, this situation will repeat itself, and a Taliban 2.0 regime, giving protection to a reinvigorated al Qaeda, could be even worse than the original version.

This article is based on Dov Zakheim's most recent book, A Vulcan's Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction of Afghanistan.